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ABSTRACT
The scalable, low overhead attributes of Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Internet protocols
and networks lend themselves well to being exploited by criminals to execute
a large range of cybercrimes. The types of crimes aided by P2P technology
include copyright infringement, sharing of illicit images of children, fraud,
hacking/cracking, denial of service attacks and virus/malware propagation
through the use of a variety of worms, botnets, malware, viruses and P2P file
sharing. This project is focused on study of active P2P nodes along with the
analysis of the undocumented communication methods employed in many of
these large unstructured networks. This is achieved through the design and
implementation of an efficient P2P monitoring and crawling toolset.
The requirement for investigating P2P based systems is not limited to the
more obvious cybercrimes listed above, as many legitimate P2P based
applications may also be pertinent to a digital forensic investigation, e.g, voice
over IP, instant messaging, etc. Investigating these networks has become
increasingly difficult due to the broad range of network topologies and the
ever increasing and evolving range of P2P based applications. In this work we
introduce the Universal P2P Network Investigation Framework (UP2PNIF),
a framework which enables significantly faster and less labour intensive
investigation of newly discovered P2P networks through the exploitation
of the commonalities in P2P network functionality. In combination with a
reference database of known network characteristics, it is envisioned that
any known P2P network can be instantly investigated using the framework,
which can intelligently determine the best investigation methodology and
greatly expedite the evidence gathering process. A proof of concept tool
xv
was developed for conducting investigations on the BitTorrent network. A
Number of investigations conducted using this tool are also outlined.
xvi
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CHAPTER
ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
In June 1999, the control that the content producing industry (composed of
movie producers, TV show producers, musicians, writers, etc.) had over
their traditional distribution model was permanently changed due to the
release, and subsequent rise in popularity, of Napster by Shawn Fanning [9].
Napster brought the relatively new concept of Internet file sharing into the
mainstream. It facilitated its users in sharing music with millions of other
users around the world. The ease of use, vast library of available content,
perceived anonymity and zero cost model enabled Napster to grow rapidly.
It’s rise in popularity also coincided with the release of new portable devices
capable of playing digital audio files, MP3 players [10]. The difference in
user difficulty between converting store bought CDs into a suitable format
when compared to performing a search for the song’s title and double clicking
the version you wanted was significant. At its peak, it enabled over 25
million users to share more than 80 millions digital songs with each other
[11]. This was not the first implementation of Peer-to-Peer (P2P) technology,
but it certainly was the first to gather attention. It enabled regular computer
users with Internet connections to perform copyright infringement on a scale
incomparable to physical copying of tapes and CDs.
P2P technologies are most known for unauthorised distribution of copyrighted
1
content but the merits of P2P have been exploited by other criminals with
more sinister intentions. The ever increasing proliferation of computers
has resulted in a new breed of high-tech, highly skilled, computer savvy
criminals emerging. For the lesser skilled criminal, a large underground
market creating and selling software packages to enable the online execution
of a range of crimes has emerged. As this phenomenon continues, an
increasing number of “offline” crimes are being aided by computers, e.g.,
fraud, identity theft, phishing, terrorism, child sexual exploitation, etc. As
a result, digital forensic investigators and law enforcement in general are
playing catchup in an attempt to gain the necessary expertise to combat
these crimes. Looking to always be one step ahead of the law, criminals are
continually looking for more advanced methods of conducting their crimes.
With the advent of “botnets”, i.e., large distributed networks of compromised
machines, criminals are now able to take advantage of far superior distributed
processing power, bandwidth and other resources than a single machine could
ever afford them. These botnets also award the criminal a relative degree of
anonymity if the botnet itself is entirely decentralised, i.e., no central server or
single point of penetration, such as a P2P botnet. Each compromised node in a
P2P botnets is obliged to forward on received commands and queries to other
known active nodes in the network. The scalable and minimal investment
attributes of P2P and similar distributed Internet protocols lend themselves
well to being exploited by criminals to execute a range of cybercrimes. These
crimes not only include those offline examples previously mentioned, but also
new computer targeted crimes, such as distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attacks, virus/malware propagation, etc.
1.2 Research Problem
Much of the existing research into P2P cybercrimes relies on packet sniffing as
the primary method for collecting information. This method involves setting
up a honeypot, as outlined in greater detail in Section 4.6.2, and deliberately
2
infecting the machine with the required malware. The downside of this type
of investigation is that the system is reliant on recording typical network
communication to find out information about the system being investigated.
Any single node on a P2P network may never communicate with every
other node, as each node generally maintains a list in the order of 5–10 other
known active nodes. The motivation for the research detailed in this thesis
is to design and test a new methodology for investigating P2P networks.
This methodology involves emulating and multiplying regular client usage
resulting in the distributed capability of crawling an entire network.
The objectives of this research are as follows:
1. Provide an insight into the technical requirements of the design and
implementation of a forensically sound P2P crawling and investigation
tool; collecting of digital evidence and the counter-detection measures
that may need to be employed.
2. Demonstrate the application of a P2P network crawling system as a
plausible option for forensic investigation.
3. Design an architecture for such a system. It should be forensically
verifiable, cost effective, expandable, reliable and widely compatible
with current computer hardware and network capacities.
4. Prototype the system and perform experimental analysis to measure
the viability of the system for both documented and undocumented
networks.
5. Draw some recommendations about future use of these technologies.
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1.3 Contribution of this Work
Many of the tools available in the field of digital network forensic
investigations are based upon the deployment of packet sniffing or deep
packet inspection devices and software, which are outlined further in Sections
2.3 and 2.4 . These methods can result in a huge volume of data to be
analysed by the forensic investigator. “Typically, only a small fraction of the
examined data is of interest in an investigation” [12]. The existing techniques
are concentrated around the procedures that should be implemented after
the physical confiscation of the computer equipment. The research outlined
as part of this thesis results in a system capable of quickly implementing
the communication protocol of any given P2P network, resulting in more
focused data collection. The data collected can be partially processed at the
point of collection, eliminating the need to store, index and analyse irrelevant
information.
The contribution of this research can be summarised as follows:
• Design of a forensically sound P2P network investigation system, which
can be used for the collection of court-admissible evidence or used for
system monitoring. The system also enables the user to conduct a cloud
based investigation. This results in the forensic investigators being able
to spend more time analysing evidence, as opposed to being in the field
collecting it. The design approach can be extended to defining how to
best deal with the issues of cost, speed, compatibility and redundancy of
the data while ensuring that the process is reproducible and reliable.
• Proof of the viability of the system through experimentation of all the
necessary components. Each component of the system was individually
tested to ensure the forensic integrity of the data collected.
• Performance results from testing “real-world” scenarios where such a
system may be used, i.e., collecting evidence from a live P2P network
investigation.
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• Outline a new forensically sound method for storing remote network
captured P2P evidence.
1.4 Limitations of this Work
With such a large variety of P2P networks and P2P based cybercrimes, a
number of limitations for the scope of this research were introduced:
1. To conduct comprehensive testing across every known P2P network was
deemed too large a task for the purposes of this work due to time and
resource constraints.
2. As a proof of concept for the viability of the system designed as
part of this work, it was deemed acceptable to perform testing and
investigation of unauthorised file-sharing occurring on P2P networks.
The methodology and techniques outlined are equally applicable to the
investigation of any P2P based cybercrimes.
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is organised as follows:
• After introducing the context and highlighting the main goals of the
project in this Chapter, in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, we present literature
reviews of related research work and software tools relevant to the
areas of Digital Forensics, P2P File-sharing and Botnet Investigation
respectively. These chapters outline some of the tools, systems,
architectures, and best practices associated with the corresponding fields
from a technical, and legal perspective.
• Chapter ?? presents the architecture and design of the universal P2P
network investigation framework capable of expansion to deal with any
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P2P network investigation. We also outline the design considerations
which should be incorporated into a framework of this nature. Chapter
?? presents the results from a proof of concept investigation tool
developed for the investigation of the BitTorrent file-sharing P2P
network. The results of comprehensive experiments carried out to prove
the viability of such a framework. This testing phase incorporated the
testing of each individual component of the system to ensure forensic
integrity and ultimately, court admissible evidence.
• Chapter 5 summarises and concludes this research. This chapter also
outlines scenarios where the technology developed can be adapted and
reused for additional purposes. Guidelines for further developments to
the presented work are also outlined and discussed.
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CHAPTER
TWO
DIGITAL FORENSIC INVESTIGATION;
STATE OF THE ART
2.1 Introduction
“A forensics expert must have the investigative skills of a detective, the
legal skills of a lawyer, and the computing skills of the criminal.” [13].
This chapter outlines some of the digital network evidence acquisition,
investigation software, and hardware tools commonly used by forensic
investigators in law enforcement and private investigations such as ForNet,
Wireshark, Security Incident and Event Management Software (SIEM),
Network Forensic Analysis Tools (NFAT), and Deep-Packet Inspection (DPI).
Current commercial, research and open-source tools are discussed specifying
their benefits and designs. Common digital evidence storage formats are
also discussed, outlining the cross-compatibility between the tools available
and the associated formats. Best practices associated with the field of digital
forensics from a technical, cryptographical and legal perspective are also
discussed.
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2.2 Computer Forensic Investigation
Generally speaking, the goal of a digital forensic investigation is to identify
digital evidence relative to a specific cybercrime. Investigations rarely rely
entirely on digital evidence to prosecute the offender, instead relying on a
case built from physical evidence, digital evidence, witness testimony and
cross-examination. However, when dealing solely with digital evidence, there
are three major phases [14]:
1. Acquisition Phase – The acquisition phase is concerned with capturing the
state of a digital system for later analysis. This is similar to the collection
of physical evidence from a crime scene, e.g., taking photographs,
collecting fingerprints, fibres, blood samples, tire patterns, etc. During
this phase in a digital investigation, it is typically very difficult to tell
which evidence is relevant to the case, so the goal of this phase is to
collect all possible digital evidence (including any data on removable
storage devices, network traffic, logs, etc.).
2. Analysis Phase – After a successful and complete acquisition of the
system state from a suspect computer, the data acquired needs to be
analysed to identify pieces of evidence. The analysis of evidence is
carried out on an exact copy of the original evidence. This copy is
verified against the original through the use of a hashing algorithm, as
outlined in more detail in Section 2.7. Carrier [14] defines three major
categories of evidence a digital investigator needs to discover when
conducting his analysis:
• Inculpatory Evidence – This is any evidence which supports a given
theory.
• Exculpatory Evidence – This is any evidence which contradicts a
given theory.
• Evidence of Tampering – This is any evidence which cannot be
related to any theory currently under investigation, but shows that
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the system was tampered with to avoid identification.
The procedure followed during this phase includes examining file
and directory contents (including recovered deleted content) to draw
verifiable conclusions based on any evidence that is collected.
3. Presentation Phase – The steps performed in the previous two phases
are the same regardless of the type of investigation being conducted,
e.g., corporate, law enforcement or military. However, the presentation
phase will be different depending on corporate policy or local law. This
phase presents the conclusions and their corresponding evidence that
the digital investigator has deduced. In a court settings, the lawyers
must first evaluate the evidence to confirm that it is court admissible.
2.2.1 Network Forensic Investigation
The 2006 National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) special
publication “Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques Into Incident
Response” [15] outlines a number of best practices and legal considerations for
forensic investigators working with network data. The NIST guide outlines
the typical sources of network evidence and tools that should be used during
the evidence collection phase of an investigation:
• Firewall and router logs – These devices are normally configured to
record suspicious activity.
• Packet Sniffing – This allows the investigator to monitor, in real-time, the
activity on the network.
• Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) – Some larger networks may employ
IDS to capture packets related to suspect activity.
• Remote Access Servers – this includes devices such as VPN gateways
and modem servers that facilitate connections between networks.
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• Security Event Management Software – These tools aid in analysis of logs
files, typically produced by IDS tools, firewalls, and routers.
• Network Forensic Analysis Tools – These tools allow a reconstruction
of events by visualising and replaying network traffic within a specified
period.
• Other Sources – These include Internet Service Provider (ISP)
records, client/server applications, hosts’ network configureration
and connections, and Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)
records.
A number of tools capable of collecting and analysing some of the above
evidence are outlined in Section 2.3.
2.3 Network Investigation Tools
While the area of Computer Forensics and Cybercrime Investigation is
relatively new among the more traditional computer security models, there
is a small number of companies and open-source tools dedicated to forensic
investigations. There are numerous free packet sniffing software tools
available. A number of these tools are discussed in the following subsections:
2.3.1 TCPDump/WinDump
TCPDump and WinDump are the Unix and Windows equivalent command
line network software analysers developed in the 1990s. The tools run on a
local machine and are capable of capturing all the network traffic over ethernet
or wireless connections. They have the ability to display in a semi-coherent
fashion the captured traffic frame by frame and allow the analysis of the data.
As its name might suggest, TCPDump focuses mainly on the TCP/IP protocol
[16]. An example capture of an SSH session using WinDump can be seen in
Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Example Frame Capture of SSH Session Using WinDump.
2.3.2 Ethereal
Ethereal is another free tool available for both Unix and Windows. It is more
user friendly than TCPDump as it has a graphical user interface (GUI) to assist
its users. Ethereal also provides a large number of protocol decoding options;
more than 400 in total [16]. It allows the forensic investigator to analyse data
collected on a packet basis or protocol basis. An example capture of an SSH
session using Ethereal and its presentation in the GUI can be seen in Figure
2.2.
Figure 2.2: Example Frame Capture of SSH Session Using Ethereal.
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2.3.3 Network Forensic Analysis Tools
NFATs are intelligent packet analysis tools capable of identifying firewall
circumvention [17]. For example, corporate firewalls may block access to
their staff from using instant messaging at work. Yahoo Messenger normally
operates on port 5050, but when this port is blocked it will automatically
switch to port 23 (usually reserved for telnet) [18]. While this port change
might bypass a firewall rule in place, an NFAT would still be able to identify
the network usage as being Yahoo Messenger due to packet analysis. NFATs
are not designed as a replacement for firewalls or IDS software, but are
designed to work in conjunction with them. Typically NFATs will rely on
another piece of software to capture the traffic, e.g., TCPDump.
2.3.4 Security Incident and Event Manager Software
SIEM software is a combination of the formally different software categories
of Security Incident Management Software and Security Event Management
Software and takes a different investigative approach to the “on-the-fly”
analysis tools outlined above. SIEM software is focused on importing security
event information for a number of network traffic related sources, e.g., IDS
logs, firewall logs, etc. [15]. It operates on an “after the fact” basis whereby it
analyses copies of the logs attempting to identify suspicious network activity
events by matching IP addresses, timestamps and other network traffic
characteristics. An open source example of this software is called OSSIM [19].
2.4 Packet Inspection Hardware
In the regular operation of Network Interface Cards (NICs), the devices only
accept incoming packets that are specifically addressed to its IP address.
However when a NIC is placed in promiscuous mode, it will accept all
packets that it sees, regardless of their intended destinations. Packet sniffing
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hardware generally operates on this principle, with configuration available
to capture all packets or only those with specific characteristics, e.g., certain
TCP ports, certain source or destination IP addresses, etc. [15]. This style of
network traffic capture can be used in combination with software sampling
optimisation techniques in order to reduce the overall size of the data to be
investigated [20].
The current standard hardware device used for digital evidence acquisition
in the forensic laboratory is the Forensic Recovery of Evidence Device
(FRED). This machine incorporates a selection of equipment tailored for
digital investigations available from Digital Intelligence [21]. Each FRED
workstation contains a collection of write-blocked (read-only) ports including
Serial Advance Technology Attachment (SATA), Integrated Drive Electronics
(IDE), Small Computer System Interface (SCSI), Universal Serial Bus (USB)
and FireWire. However in order to perform network evidence capture, the
workstation incorporates a standard 10/100/1000Mb ethernet card due to
the requirement for any NIC to both send and receive packets. This NIC is
capable of collecting network evidence when used in conjunction with one of
the software tools outlined above.
2.5 Evidence Storage Formats
There is currently no universal standard for the format that digital evidence
and any case related information is stored. This is due to the fact that there are
no state or international governmental policies to outline a universal format.
Many of the vendors developing forensic tools have their own proprietary
evidence storage format. With such a small target market (mainly law
enforcement), it sometimes makes business sense for them to try to lock their
customers into a proprietary format. This results in their users being more
likely to buy only their software in the future as it will be compatible with
their existing evidence. There have been a number of attempts at creating
open formats to store evidence and its related metadata. The following
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subsections describe the most common evidence storage formats.
2.5.1 Common Digital Evidence Storage Format
The Common Digital Evidence Storage Format (CDESF) Working Group
was created as part of the Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DRFWS) in
2006. The goal of this group was to create an open data format for storing
digital forensic evidence and its associated metadata from multiple sources,
e.g., computer hard drives, mobile Internet devices, etc. [22]. The format
which the CDESF working group were attempting to create would have
specified metadata capable of storing case-specific information such as case
number, digital photographs of any physical evidence and the name of the
digital investigator conducting the investigation. In 2006, the working group
produced a paper outlining the advantages and disadvantages of various
evidence storage formats [23].
Due to resource restrictions, the CDESF working group was disbanded in 2007
before accomplishing their initial goal.
2.5.2 Raw Format
According to the CDESF Working Group, “the current de facto standard for
storing information copied from a disk drive or memory stick is the so-called
“raw” format: a sector-by-sector copy of the data on the device to a file” [24].
The raw format is so-called due to the fact that it is simply a file containing the
exact sector-by-sector copy of the original evidence, e.g., files, hard disk/flash
memory sectors, network packets, etc. Raw files are not compressed in any
manner and as a result, any deleted or partially overwritten evidence that may
lay in the slackspace of a hard disk is maintained. All of the commercial digital
evidence capturing tools available today have the capability of creating raw
files.
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2.5.3 Advanced Forensic Format
The Advanced Forensic Format (AFF) is an open source, extensible format
created by S. Garfinkel in Basis Technology in 2006 [25]. The AFF format has
a major emphasis on efficiency and as a result it is partitioned into two layers;
the disk representation layer which defines segment name used for storing
all data associated with an image and the data storage layer which defines
how the image is stored (binary or XML) [26]. The format specifies three
file extensions; *.aff, *.afd and *.afm. *.aff files store all data and metadata
in a single file, *.afd files store the data and metadata in multiple small files,
and *.afm files store the data in a raw format and the metadata is stored in a
separate XML file [26].
2.5.4 Generic Forensic Zip
Generic Forensic Zip (gfzip) is an open source project. Its goal is to create
a forensically sound compressed digital evidence format based on AFF 2.5.3
[27]. Due to the fact that it is based upon the AFF format, there is limited
compatibility between the two in terms of segment based layout. One key
advantage that gfzip has over the AFF format is that gfzip seeks to maintain
compatibility with the raw format, as described in Section 2.5.2. It achieves
this by allowing the raw data to be placed first in the compressed image [26].
2.5.5 Digital Evidence Bag (QinetiQ)
The method for traditional evidence acquisition involves a law enforcement
officer collecting any relevant items at the crimescene and storing the evidence
in bags and seals. These evidence bags may then be tagged with any relevant
case specific information, such as [28]:
• Investigating Agency / Police Force
• Exhibit reference number
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• Property reference number
• Case/Suspect name
• Brief description of the item
• Date and time the item was seized/produced
• Location of where the item was seized/produced
• Name of the person that is producing the item as evidence
• Signature of the person that is producing the item
• Incident/Crime reference number
• Laboratory reference number
Physical evidence containers, such as evidence bags, are trusted due to the
well understood and practised process called “chain of custody” [29].
Digital Evidence Bag (DEB) is a digital version of the traditional evidence bag,
created by Philip Turner in 2005 [28]. DEB is based on an adaptation of existing
storage formats, with potentially infinite capacity. The data stored in a DEB is
stored in multiple files, along with metadata containing the information that
would traditionally be written outside on an evidence bag. There are currently
no tools released that are compatible with the QinetiQ DEB format.
2.5.6 Digital Evidence Bag (WetStone Technologies)
In 2006, C. Hosmer, from WetStone Technologies Inc. [30], published a paper
outlining the design of a Digital Evidence Bag (DEB) format for storing digital
evidence [29]. This format is independent from the Digital Evidence Bag
outlined in Section 2.5.5. The format emerged from a research project funded
by the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory. The motivation for this format
was similar to that described in Section 2.5.5, i.e., to metaphorically mimic
the plastic evidence bag used by crime scene investigators to collect physical
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evidence such as fibres, hairs, etc. This format will be released publicly when
complete.
2.5.7 EnCase Format
The EnCase format for storing digital forensic is proprietary to the evidence
analysis tool of the same name [31]. It is by far the most common evidence
storage option used by law enforcement and private digital investigation
companies [26]. Because of the proprietary nature of the format, along with
the lack of any open formal specification from Guidance Software [32], much
remains unknown about the format itself. Some competitors to Guidance
Software have attempted to reverse engineer the format to provide an element
of cross-compatibility with their tools [25]. EnCase stores a disk image as a
series of unique compressed pages. Each page can be individually retrieved
and decompressed in the investigative computer’s memory as needed,
allowing a somewhat random access to the contents of the image file. The
EnCase format also has the ability to store metadata such as a case number
and an investigator [25].
2.6 Evidence Handling
When analysing physical evidence, the commonly used procedure is known
as the “chain of custody” [28]. The chain of custody commences at the crime
scene where the evidence is collected, when the investigating officer collects
any evidence s/he finds and places it into an evidence bag. This evidence bag
will be sealed to avoid any contamination from external sources and signed
by the officer and will detail some facts about the evidence, e.g., description
of evidence, location, date and time it was found etc. The chain of custody
will then be updated again when the evidence is checked into the evidence
store. When it comes to analysing the evidence, it will be checked out to the
analysts’ custody and any modification to the evidence required to facilitate
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the investigation, e.g., taking a sample from a collected fibre to determine its
origin or unique properties. Each interaction with the evidence will be logged
and documented.
The procedures outlined above for physical evidence need to be slightly
modified for evidence acquisition and analysis. Due to the fact that digital
evidence is analysed on forensic workstations, most of the above sequences
can be automated into concise logging of all interactions. During a digital
investigation, there is no requirement to modify the existing evidence in
any way. This is because all analysis is conducted on an image of the
original source and any discovered evidence can be extracted from this
image, documented and stored separately to both the original source and
the copied image. It is imperative when dealing with all types of evidence
that all procedures used are reliable, reproducible and verifiable. In order for
evidence to be court admissible, it must pass the legal criteria for the locality
that the court case is being heard, as outlined in greater detail in Section 2.8.
2.6.1 What does “Forensically Sound” really mean?
Many of the specifications for digital forensic acquisition and analysis tools,
storage formats and hash functions state that the product in question is
“forensically sound” or that the product works with the digital evidence in
a “forensically sound manner”, without specifying exactly what the term
means. In 2007, E. Casey published a paper in the Digital Investigation Journal
entitled “What does “forensically sound” really mean ?” [33].
In the paper, Casey outlined some of the common views of forensic
professionals with regard to dealing with digital forensic evidence. Purists
state that any digital forensic tools should not alter the original evidence in
any way. Others point out that the act of preserving certain types of evidence
necessarily alters the original, e.g., a live memory evidence acquisition tool
must be loaded into memory (altering the state of the volatile memory and
possibly overwriting some latent evidence) in order to run the tool and capture
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any evidence contained in the memory. Casey then goes onto to explain how
some traditional forensic process require the alteration of some of the evidence
in order to collect the required information. For example, collecting DNA
evidence requires taking a sample from some collected evidence, e.g., a hair.
Subsequently, the forensic analysis of this evidentiary sample (DNA profiling)
is destructive in its nature which further alters the original evidence.
Casey summarises that from a forensic standpoint, evidence acquisition
and handling should modify the evidence as little as possible and when
modification is unavoidable, it should be well documented and considered
in the final analytical results. “Provided the acquisition process preserves a
complete and accurate representation of the original data, and its authenticity
and integrity can be validated, it is generally considered forensically sound”
[33].
2.7 Cryptographic Hash Functions
Cryptographic hash functions are deterministic procedures which operate
by taking a block of data or a file as input and output a fixed length digital
fingerprint or cryptographic hash value/sum. The data input to a hash
function is commonly referred to as the “message“, while the hash sum
produced is referred to as the digest.
The ideal collision resistant cryptographic hash function (h) has four main
properties, defined by B. Preneel as part of his Ph.D. thesis in 1993 [34]:
1. The description of h must be publicly known and should not require any
secret information for its operation.
2. The argument/message X can be of arbitrary length and the result h(X)
has a fixed length of n bits (with n ≥ 128).
3. Given h and X, the computation of h(X) must be “easy”.
4. The hash function must be “one-way” in the sense that given a Y, it
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is infeasible to find a message X such that h(X) = Y , i.e., it should be
impractical to modify a message without changing its hash. It should
also be infeasible given X and h(X) to find a message X’ 6= X such that
h(X’) = h(X), i.e., it should not be possible to have two different messages
with the same hash.
5. The hash function must be collision resistant: this means that one should
not find two distinct messages that hash to the same result. It also should
not be feasible to find a message X that has a given hash sum h(X).
2.7.1 Collision Resistance
The measure of the unlikelihood of two different inputs to a hashing function
returning the same hash sum is known as the collision resistance of the hash
function. Generally speaking, the larger the internal state size that the hashing
function has to operate with, the better the collision resistance of that function.
In 2005, Wang and Yu published a paper outlining their attempts to break a
number of specified hash functions, entitled “How to Break MD5 and Other
Hash Functions” [35]. In this paper they described a method for engineering
two files which, when hashed using MD5, would result in having the same
hash sum. In their experiments, they created two different files, F1 and F2, by
reverse engineering them to have the specific bits in the specific file locations
required for the hashing function to produce an identical hash sum so far.
It is important to note that there is no documented evidence that, if given a
specific file F1, that anyone is capable of engineering a second file F2 that has
the same hash sum. As a result of this paper, the United States Computer
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), part of the United States’ Department
of Homeland Security, published a vulnerability note stating that MD5 should
be considered cryptographically broken and unsuitable for further use and
that most United States governmental applications will be required to move to
the SHA-2 family of hashing functions by 2010 [36].
To date, no collisions have been found in any of the SHA-2 family of hashing
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functions.
2.7.2 Avalanche Effect
The avalanche effect of a cryptographic hashing function refers to a desirable
property whereby should the input file be modified slightly [37], e.g., changing
a single bit of the file, the resultant hash sum produced changes significantly.
The term “avalanche effect” used to describe this property was created by H.
Feistel in 1975 [38]. Table 2.1 shows a sample set of common hashing functions
along with sample hash sums they produce for two slightly different input
files showing the influence the avalanche effect has on each function.
2.7.3 Overview of Common Hashing Algorithms
While there are hundreds, if not thousands, of hashing functions in existence,
the list of commonly used functions is significantly shorter. This is due to
the fact that NIST and the National Security Agency (NSA) in the United
States have prioritised the standardisation of hashing functions. The most
popular hashing functions, outlined below, are all based on the message
digest principle. The message digest principle was designed by Ronald Rivest
[39] and constitutes a hash function taking in a message of arbitrary length
and producing a fixed length message digest (hash value/sum) based on that
input.
2.7.3.1 MD Family
The Message Digest (MD) algorithm family of hash functions were all created
by Ronald Rivest, a professor in Massachusetts Institute of Technology, along
with some collaboration from others. The family contains six iterations of
the algorithms; MD, MD2 (1988), MD3 (1989), MD4(1990), MD5 (1991) and
MD6 (2008.) From the original iteration up as far as MD5, the algorithms all
produced 128-bit message digests. These MD hash values are expressed as 32
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Hash
Algorithm
Length
in
bits
Sentence 1: The quick
brown fox jumps
over the lazy dog
Sentence 2: The quick
brown fox jumps
over the lazy cog
Diff
%
Adler32 32 5BDC0FDA 5BD90FD9 25.0%
CRC32 32 414FA339 4400B5BC 87.5%
Haval 128 713502673D67E5FA
557629A71D331945
4C9409BE8321D982
72D9252F610FBB5B
93.8%
MD2 128 03D85A0D629D2C44
2E987525319FC471
6B890C9292668CDB
BFDA00A4EBF31F05
93.8%
MD4 128 1BEE69A46BA81118
5C194762ABAEAE90
B86E130CE7028DA5
9E672D56AD0113DF
93.8%
MD5 128 9E107D9D372BB682
6BD81D3542A419D6
1055D3E698D289F2
AF8663725127BD4B
100%
RipeMD128 128 3FA9B57F053C053F
BE2735B2380DB596
3807AAAEC58FE336
733FA55ED13259D9
93.8%
RipeMD160 160 37F332F68DB77BD9
D7EDD4969571AD67
1CF9DD3B
132072DF69093383
5EB8B6AD0B77E7B6
F14ACAD7
95.0%
SHA-1 160 2FD4E1C67A2D28FC
ED849EE1BB76E739
1B93EB12
DE9F2C7FD25E1B3A
FAD3E85A0BD17D9B
100DB4B3
95.0%
SHA-256 256 D7A8FBB307D78094
69CA9ABCB0082E4F
8D5651E46D3CDB76
2D02D0BF37C9E592
E4C4D8F3BF76B692
DE791A173E053211
50F7A345B46484FE
427F6ACC7ECC81BE
95.3%
SHA-384 384 CA737F1014A48F4C
0B6DD43CB177B0AF
D9E5169367544C49
4011E3317DBF9A50
9CB1E5DC1E85A941
BBEE3D7F2AFBC9B1
098CEA620B0978CA
A5F0BEFBA6DDCF22
764BEA977E1C70B3
483EDFDF1DE25F4B
40D6CEA3CADF00F8
09D422FEB1F0161B
95.8%
SHA-512 512 07E547D9586F6A73
F73FBAC0435ED769
51218FB7D0C8D788
A309D785436BBB64
2E93A252A954F239
12547D1E8A3B5ED6
E1BFD7097821233F
A0538F3DB854FEE6
3EEEE1D0E11733EF
152A6C29503B3AE2
0C4F1F3CDA4CB26F
1BC1A41F91C7FE4A
B3BD86494049E201
C4BD5155F31ECB7A
3C8606843C4CC8DF
CAB7DA11C8AE5045
96.1%
Table 2.1: Example hash sums for a small file containing the sentences
outlined. The percentage difference shows the difference in the hash sums
produced. While each character of a hash is hexadecimal, i.e., 1 of 16 possible
values, it is notable that some hashing functions have differences greater
than the expected maximum difference, i.e., >93.8%. This is due to a more
pronounced avalanche effect in the hashing function.
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hexadecimal digits, as can be seen in Table 2.1. MD6 is based on a variable
length message digest size to improve performance for smaller inputs, and as
a result the message digest can be anywhere in the range from 0 - 512 bits in
length.
MD5 is a popular hash function used in numerous applications. Most of the
tools available to the digital investigator rely on a combination of the CRC32
and the MD5 hash functions for maintaining data integrity [23].
MD6 was entered into the competition for the SHA-3 Family of hash functions.
However, in July 2009, the algorithm was withdrawn from the competition
because in order for it to be fast enough to compete, the design would have
had to compromise its resistance to differential attacks.
2.7.3.2 SHA-0 and SHA-1 Family
The first specification of the Secure Hashing Algorithm (SHA) family of
hashing functions was published in 1993 by the US National Institute for
Standards and Technology. This early specification is now known as the
SHA-0 function. SHA-0 was withdrawn from use by the US National Security
Agency in 1995 and was replaced by a modified version of the function;
SHA-1. Both SHA-0 and SHA-1 produce 160-bit hash sums and they have a
maximum input message size of 264 − 1 bits (or 2048 petabytes).
X. Wang, Y.L. Yin and H. Yu produced a paper entitled “Finding Collisions
in the Full SHA-1” in 2005 [40]. This paper outlined the first attack on the
SHA-1 hash function. The authors successfully found collisions on the SHA-1
function. They achieved this by first finding near-collisions. They then were
able to discover full collisions based on the analysis of the near collisions.
They conclude that although the SHA-1 family of hash functions has message
expansion, it does not offer enough avalanche effect in terms of differing
inputs.
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2.7.3.3 SHA-2 Family
The SHA-2 Family consists of the following hash functions: SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. The number in the name of the hash
function represents the output message digest size in bits. H. Gilbert and H.
Handschuh produced a journal paper entitled “Security Analysis of SHA-256
and Sisters” in 2004 [41] which published their results from the analysis of the
SHA-2 family of hash functions. They found that the attacks that have broken
the SHA-1 family no longer are applicable to the SHA-2 family.
The SHA-224 and SHA-256 have the same maximum input file size of 264 − 1
bits (or 2048 petabytes) as with the SHA-1 Family, while the SHA-384 and
SHA-512 have a maximum of 2128 − 1 bits (or 3.78 x 1022 petabytes).
2.7.3.4 SHA-3 Family
NIST, part of the Department of Commerce, held a five year development
competition to decide on which hashing function to choose for the third
iteration of the SHA Family. As part of the competition, NIST accepted over
60 entries into the first round of testing. This number was reduced down to
14 accepted into the second round which was announced in August 2009 [42].
The remaining candidates in the second round are BLAKE [43], Blue Midnight
Wish [44], CubeHash [45], ECHO [46], Fugue [47], Grøstl [48], Hamsi [49],
JH [50], Keccak [51], Luffa [52], Shabal [53], SHAvite-3 [54], SIMD [55] and
Skein [56]. The winner of the hashing function, Keccak, was announced in
November 2012 after evaluation of the final round entries [57]. Keccak uses
a “sponge construction” with no explicit maximum limit for file size and for
produces a variable length hash.
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2.8 Court Admissible Evidence
Since the United States leads the way with the implementation of many
standards in relation to evidence handling and the court admissibility of
evidence, many other countries look to the procedures outlined by the United
States in this area when attempting to create their own legal procedures [58].
As a result, much of the information available regarding the admissibility of
digital forensic evidence into court cases is specifically tailored to the Unites
States, but will influence law makers across the globe. Carrier [14] states that
in order for evidence to be admissible into a United States legal proceeding,
the scientific evidence (a category which digital forensic evidence falls under
in the U.S.) must pass the so-called “Daubert Test” (see Section 2.8.1 below).
The reliability of the evidence is determined by the judge in a pre-trail
“Daubert Hearing”. The judge’s responsibility in the Daubert Hearing is to
determine whether the methodologies and techniques used to identify the
evidence was sound, and as a result, whether the evidence is reliable.
2.8.1 Daubert Test
The “Daubert Test” stems from the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in
the case of Daubert vs. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993) [59]. The Daubert
process outlines four general categories that are used as guidelines by the
judge when assessing the procedure(s) followed when handling the evidence
during the acquisition, analysis and reporting phases of the investigation, [14]
and [59]:
1. Testing – Has the procedure been tested? Testing of any procedure should
include testing of the number of false negatives, e.g., if the tool displays
filenames in a given directory, then all file names must be shown. It
should also incorporate testing of the number of false positives, e.g. if
the tool was designed to capture digital evidence, and it reports that
it was successful, then all forensic evidence must be exactly copied to
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the destination. NIST have a dedicated group working on Computer
Forensic Tool Testing (CFTT) [60].
2. Error Rate – Is there a known error rate of the procedure? For example,
accessing data on a disk formatted in a documented file format, e.g.,
FAT32 or ext2, should have a very low error rate, with the only
errors involved being programming errors on behalf of the developer.
Acquiring evidence from an officially undocumented file format, e.g.,
NTFS, may result in unknown file access errors occurring, in addition to
the potential programming error rate.
3. Publication – Has the procedure been published and subject to peer
review? The main condition for evidence admission under the
predecessor to the Daubert Test, the Frye Test, was that the procedure
was documented in a public place and undergone a peer review process.
This condition has been maintained in the Daubert Test [14]. In the area
of digital forensics, there is only one major peer-reviewed journal, the
International Journal of Digital Evidence.
4. Acceptance – Is the procedure generally accepted in the relevant scientific
community? For this guideline to be assessed, published guidelines are
required. Closed source tools have claimed their acceptance by citing the
large number of users they have. The developers of these tools do not
cite how many of their users are from the scientific community, or how
many have the ability to scientifically assess the tool. However, having
a tool with a large user base can only prove acceptance of the tool; it
cannot prove the acceptance of the undocumented procedure followed
when using the tool.
In 2005, The House of Commons Science and Technology Committee in the
United Kingdom published a report entitled “Forensic Science on Trial” [58].
In this report they outline numerous standards to be used across the field
of forensics. As part of this report, the admissibility of expert evidence is
discussed. As it stood in the UK when the report was written, the judge
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of any given case had the role of the “gate-keeper” for any evidence s/he
would admit into his/her court. It was determined that judges are not
well-placed to determine the scientific validity without input from scientists,
especially due to the absence of an agreed protocol for assessment. The main
recommendation to come from the report is that the Forensic Science Advisory
Council should develop a “gate-keeping” test for expert evidence, built in
partnership with judges, scientists and other key players from the criminal
justice system and that it should be built upon the US Daubert Test [58].
2.9 Legal Considerations of Network Forensics
Collecting network traffic can pose legal issues. Deploying a packet sniffing
or deep packet inspection device, such as those outlined above, can result
in the (intentional or incidental) capture of information with privacy and
security implications, such as passwords or e-mail content, etc. As privacy has
become a greater concern for regular computer users and organisations, many
have become less willing to cooperate or share any information with law
enforcement. For example, most ISPs will now require a court order before
providing any information related to suspicious activity on their networks
[15]. In Europe, continental legal systems operate on the principle of free
introduction and free evaluation of evidence and provide that all means of
evidence, irrespective of the form they assume, can be admitted into legal
proceedings [61].
One aspect of the use of search and seizure warrants in an Internet
environment concerns the geographical scope of the warrant issued by a
judge or a court authorising the access to the digital data. In the past, the
use of computer-generated evidence in court has posed legal difficulties
in common law countries, and especially in Australia, Canada, the United
Kingdom and the USA. The countries are characterised by an oral and
adversarial procedure. Knowledge from secondary sources is regarded
as “hearsay evidence”, such as other persons, books, records, etc., and in
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principle is inadmissible. However, digital evidence has become widely
admissible due to several exceptions to this hearsay rule [61].
2.10 Summary
This chapter describes some foundations behind the system described in
Chapter ??. It outlined some of the tools, formats, tests and procedures used
for the acquisition and analysis of digital forensic evidence. This chapter
also outlined some network focused forensic tools and systems developed
for aiding digital forensic investigations. Traditionally, in order for a digital
forensic investigation to begin, the investigator must physically visit the crime
scene and collect any suspect computer equipment. This equipment will
then be brought back to the forensic laboratory. When investigating network
crimes, the procedure is somewhat different. The forensic investigator may
need to install a physical deep packet inspection device onto the suspect’s
Internet connection (assuming a warrant is granted to do so). This will then
typically be left in situ for a predetermined amount of time and then taken
away for analysis. This DPI device will generally contain all of the suspects
network traffic for the investigation duration. Analysis, and subsequent
detection of any incriminating evidence, can only begin at this stage. As a
result of this offline analysis, it may be some time before an arrest can be
made.
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CHAPTER
THREE
PEER-TO-PEER FILE-SHARING
3.1 Introduction
P2P networks can be used in a number of ways including distributed
computing, collaboration and communication, but perhaps they are best
known for their use in file-sharing [62]. In 1999, three influential P2P systems
were launched attracting significant interest in the Internet technology; the
Napster music sharing system, the Freenet anonymous data store and the
SETI@home distributed volunteer-based scientific computing project [63].
In 2008, Cisco estimated that P2P file sharing accounted for 3,384 petabytes
per month of global Internet traffic, or 55.6% of the total usage. Cisco forecast
that P2P traffic will account for 9,629 petabytes per month globally in 2013
(approximately 30% of total global usage) [64]. While the volume of P2P
traffic is set to almost triple from 2008-2013, its proportion of total Internet
traffic is set to decrease due to the rising popularity of media streaming sites
and one-click file hosting sites (often referred to as “cyberlockers”) such as
Rapidshare, Mega, Mediafire, etc. Cisco estimate that P2P file transfer will
decline over the next few years to 5,755 petabytes per month by 2017 [65]. The
decline is accounted for due to the rise in streaming services and traditional
server based file-sharing. BitTorrent is the most popular P2P protocol used
worldwide and accounts for the biggest proportion of Internet traffic when
compared to other P2P protocols. The most recent measurement data from
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Ipoque GmbH. has measured BitTorrent traffic to account for anything from
20-70% of total Internet usage in 2009, depending on the specific geographical
area concerned [66]. With the evolution towards employing encrypted
traffic, these measurement statistics have been upwardly estimated over the
measured traffic.
3.1.1 Financial Impact on Content Producing Industry
The content producing industries report that revenue figures are steadily
declining as a result of online piracy. The International Federation of
the Phonographic Industry’s (IFPI) Digital Music Report 2011 states that
legitimate digital music distribution is up 1000% from 2004 to 2010, although
total global recorded music revenues are down 31% over the same period
[67]. The report cites Internet piracy as having a significant impact on their
sales. The report cites a study from 2010 entitled “Piracy, Music and Movies:
A Natural Experiment” which estimates that physical sales would be up 72%
with the abolishment of piracy in Sweden [68].
The 2012 Digital Music report states that 28% of Internet users are accessing
at least one unlicensed site monthly and that approximately half of those
users are using P2P networks [69]. In 2006, Zentner [70] summarises that
downloading MP3 files online reduces the probability of buying music by
30%. In 2008, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) reported
that Internet piracy cost the film industry $7 billion that year [71].
While the figures outlined above are provided by the content producing
industry, the figures of total physical and digital sales in comparison to illegal
downloads are not available or provided by the industry for independent
verification. However, unauthorised distribution of copyrighted content must
have an impact on the profits of the industry as a whole. As a result of these
financial losses incurred by the content producing industry, there has been
a significant push for technological and legislative measures to deter users
from choosing the pirated option. A number of these measures are outlined in
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Sections 3.2 and 3.6.
Research has been conducted into the decision of an average consumer to
legally purchase digital content versus the decision to illegally download
the content. In his 2005 paper, Fetscherin evaluated the choices made by
consumers in legally or illegally downloading movies on the Kazaa P2P
network [72]. He found that the majority of users prefer to download movies
legally, but that a significant number will always opt for the free option. The
factors affecting consumer behaviour in this legal/illegal choice are, in order,
the risk of being caught, the price, the perceived value of the original and the
availability of high quality copies.
In 2013, the European Commission’s Institute for Prospective Technological
Studies published a working paper analysing the impact of illegal
downloading and legal streaming on the legal purchases of digital music [73].
The results were based on over 16,000 European consumers from all European
Commission (EC) countries. It was found that Internet users do not view
illegal downloading as a substitute for legal digital music. An increase of 10%
of clicks on illegal downloading websites was found to lead to a 0.2% increase
in clicks on legal purchase websites.
3.2 Legislative Response to Online Piracy
While not merely limited to P2P file-sharing, there has been significant
effort globally to create new legislative measures to combat online copyright
infringement. A number of these provisions are outlined below [74]:
1. Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) – This United States act states that if a
website is deemed to be dedicated to the theft of U.S. property then it
should be blocked by various Internet companies. These include ISPs,
search engines, payment providers and advertising services. Each must
prevent access to the site for their customers and cease operation with
the site and its owners. This act has facilitated the significant seizure of
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Internet domain names by the U.S. government since 2012.
2. PROTECT IP Act (PIPA) – In the United States, the “Preventing Real
Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property
Act of 2011” allows the Attorney General to sue operators of Internet
sites dedicated to infringing activities.
3. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) – This is a treaty signed
between the United States, Australia, Canada, Korea, Japan, New
Zealand, Morocco, and Singapore. The treaty specifies that laws should
be created to make those responsible for copyright infringement on a
commercial scale criminally liable.
4. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) – This is a trade agreement
negotiated between the United States, Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia,
New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. This broadly defined
agreement states that its member countries must legislate for significant
wilful copyright infringement for financial gain.
5. Graduated Response – France, New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan
and the United Kingdom have implemented various “three strikes”
laws, with Ireland and the United States having a voluntary system
put in place [71]. The model requires the rights holders to monitor for
unauthorised online infringing activity and reporting the corresponding
IP addresses to the ISP involved. The ISP can identify the customer and
send them a notification. Repeat infringers risk bandwidth throttling,
protocol blocking or account suspension.
As deduced by Carrier [74], the language used in the existing treaties, acts and
agreements outlined above is quite vague. The resulting lack of clarity enables
biased interpretations, which in turn promotes a litigation based business
model. Carrier claims this will ultimately stem innovation. While it’s clear
that there is a need for legislation to protect content producers, the current
iterations leave much open to various interpretation.
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3.3 Peer-to-Peer File-sharing System Design
When designing and implementing a P2P file-sharing system, developers
must make a number of key decisions regarding the network and its purposes:
1. Centralised/Decentralised/Hybrid – A centralised network can offer a
simpler design whereas a decentralised design can offer a more robust
network. Hybrid networks are much more complex to implement but
can offer many of the advantages of both centralised and decentralised
systems.
2. Open Source/Proprietary – Making the network design and client open
source promotes an active development community but may result in
compatibility issues across numerous clients with different update cycles
resulting in newer features taking some time to roll out across all clients.
3. Encrypted/Unencrypted – Encrypting all network communication
can help eliminate some of the packet sniffing investigation methods
deployed by IT administrators and investigators but can decrease the
performance of the overall system.
3.3.1 Centralised Design
In a centralised P2P network design, there are one or more central servers
which puts users in contact with each other. When a new user wishes to
join the network, s/he registers with a known server which, in turn, is able
to supply the user with a list of other known active peers currently on the
network. Depending on the specific centralised design, the server itself
may index the entire system, i.e., maintain an active list of users and the
content they are sharing, or help contribute to a distributed hash table (DHT)
maintained by the server. The latter option passes much of the querying
load onto the connected peers. Hashing is used to prevent the accidental
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Figure 3.1: Centralised P2P system overview.
downloading of incorrect content, e.g., two files on the network with the same
name but with different content.
A sample centralised usage scenario is shown in Figure 3.1, whereby the server
records each user’s shared files. On the left hand side of the figure, the P2P
client issues a request to the server for any users sharing a specific piece of
content. The server responds with a list (IP addresses and port numbers)
of active nodes on the network sharing that content. Once the user chooses
one of these files to download, the server no longer has any further part in
the interaction. The user’s client software will connect directly to the remote
peer and download the file directly. In most modern systems built using this
design, the user may download part of the desired file from multiple other
peers simultaneously. This is shown on the right hand side of the figure and
results in a faster throughput of the download by distributing the workload.
Once all the required parts are complete, the file is combined into the original
content and is immediately available to the user. By default, many P2P systems
automatically make any newly downloaded files available on the network for
other peers.
The advantage of a centralised design lies in its efficiency of conducting
queries and the resultant small traffic footprint devoted to querying.
However, the most significant downside to a centralised design is that there is
a single point of failure. If the central server is disrupted or removed from the
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network, the entire network ceases to function and is rendered useless.
3.3.2 Decentralised Design
Decentralised P2P network design removes the single point of failure from the
centralised design outlined above. It achieves this by enforcing that each node
in the network simultaneously plays the role of client and server. When a node
receives a query request, that request is passed on to all known nodes and the
results are passed back to the source of the query. Each node in the network
maintains a small active list of current connections and helps to contribute to
a DHT. To remove any loss to the DHT as a result of a node going offline, each
distributed part will exist on multiple nodes.
The primary advantage of a decentralised system is that there is no single point
of failure. Removing any single node from the network will have no significant
impact on the entire system. However, due to its decentralised design, each
query will take much longer to complete as the query needs to be passed
directly from node to node before any response comes back to the source. As a
result, the larger the network becomes, the longer the time required to conduct
a complete search of the entire network will become. This results in a much
larger querying traffic footprint in order to keep the network functional. There
are a number of solutions to this problem, i.e., limiting the number of hops a
query can be passed along, including a specified query timeout, etc. However,
each of these solutions result in a partial search of the network.
A sample usage scenario is outlined in Figure 3.2 showing how each node acts
as both a client and a server. The query can be seen passing from node to
node until a “hit” is found. Depending on the design, this query hit might get
passed back through the same sequence of steps the query took or alternatively
may be relayed directly back to the querying node. The file transfer occurs in
a similar direct fashion as exists in a centralised P2P network. When a new
node wishes to join the network, it needs to bootstrap onto the DHT in some
manner. Depending on the implementation of the network, there may be a
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Figure 3.2: Decentralised P2P system overview.
hardcoded list of always-on DHT servers or a list of always-on nodes. These
servers/nodes can provide a new client with a list of active nodes to bootstrap
onto the network.
3.3.3 Hybrid Design
Hybrid P2P networks take on a number of the features from both centralised
and decentralised networks in an attempt to overcome the limitations of each.
This type of network will employ a large number of centralised servers to
prevent the network becoming dysfunctional if an individual server should
be taken offline. In practice, these servers are actually regular peers on the
network. Static hybrid networks allow a peer to specify that they would like
to become a server, or “supernode” in the configuration of the client software,
e.g., in eDonkey. Dynamic hybrid network clients, e.g., Limewire, FastTrack
and Gnutella, can automatically promote any peer to become a supernode
dependant on specified criteria such as uptime, bandwidth capability, latency
etc.
Querying a hybrid network can involve varying query distribution options.
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Figure 3.3: Hybrid P2P system overview.
There are two main query propagation mechanisms employed by hybrid P2P
networks [75]:
1. Random Walk – Employing this mechanism, a file search query is sent
randomly to known neighbours in the network. If this node can resolve
the query, i.e., has a file matching the request, a query hit is sent back
to the source of the request. If it does not resolve the query, it randomly
passes this query onto another neighbour from its list and the process
iterates until either a hit is returned or a timeout kills the query.
2. Expanding Ring – This query propagation option can be thought of
as a sequence of flooding searches in which the time-to-live (TTL) is
increased at each iteration. A simple flooding search is conducted
whereby a query is sent to all known neighbours. Each neighbour will
propagate the received query onto all of its active neighbours (it will
only forward on each specific query once). Again, if any node can
resolve the query, it will directly reply to the origin of the query with
a hit. The query dies when the TTL reaches zero. This propagation
mechanism is outlined in Figure 3.3, where a query is sent from a node to
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a supernode. If this supernode cannot resolve the query, it is forwarded
onto other supernodes and a query hit is returned directly to the source
node. File transfer then commences directly between the nodes.
3.4 Peer-to-Peer File-sharing Networks
3.4.1 Napster
Figure 3.4: Screenshot of Napster. Downloads can be seen at the top, with
uploads at the bottom.
In 1999, Napster pioneered the idea of global P2P file sharing. This early
stage MP3 sharing network was supported by a centralised file search facility.
Users could query this centralised database for desired content and their
clients would be advised of other users currently sharing that piece of content.
The client would then proceed to download this content directly off the user
hosting the content. Due to its “free” usage model, Napster quickly grew
to become a large global P2P network. By the end of 2000, Napster grew to
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over 75 million users sharing over 10,000 MP3 files every second [62]. The
centralised index ultimately was the downfall of Napster’s design. In July
2001, after losing a court case with the Recording Industry Association of
America, Napster became the first P2P system to be ordered to shutdown in
what has become known as the “Napster Decision” [74].
3.4.2 Gnutella
Figure 3.5: Limewire Screenshot.
Gnutella was released in 2000 as an open source file-sharing protocol by
Nullsoft. When the system was released online, Nullsoft’s owners, America
Online Inc., first learned of its existence and the company quickly ordered the
removal of the release from the Internet. However, the protocol was already
downloaded by numerous other developers who were able to publish the
specification [76]. This enabled numerous popular clients to be built on the
protocol including BearShare, FrostWire, Morpheus, Shareaza and LimeWire
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(shown in Figure 3.5). Gnutella clients are generally capable of resuming any
partially completed downloads by reestablishing connections to previously
known or new peers sharing the same content [77].
The Gnutella protocol adopts decentralised search algorithms which
effectively eliminate the single point of failure of the centralised approach
creating a much more robust network. This results in clients searching for
content shared on Gnutella bouncing the query from node to node, with
any hits being reported back through a reversed sequence of these network
bounces [78]. A sample Gnutella node map is shown in Figure 3.6 with
supernodes, represented as solid dots, acting as servers for many leaf nodes
(represented as hollow dots) [76].
Figure 3.6: Gnutella Node Map.
The decentralisation of the network also left the network open and vulnerable
to exploitation. While “legitimate” sharing of copyrighted content is the
primary focus of the network, it was quickly exploited for malicious purposes
by cybercriminals, e.g., the spread of viruses, worms and botnets. In 2008,
Kalafut et al. found that 68% of all downloadable responses in Limewire
(Gnutella’s largest client at the time) containing archives and executables
contained malware [79].
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3.4.3 eDonkey
eDonkey is one of the most successful P2P applications and operates on
a hybrid P2P network of the same name. Alternative clients built on the
protocol include eMule, Morpheus, Shareaza and MLDonkey. The systems
uses a distributed network of servers running a specific server application.
The servers do not share any files and only aid in the management of the
distributed information through indexing which peers are sharing which files.
The network gained significant popularity in Europe; with Germany, France
and Austria topping the geographical overview accounting for 66.21%, 6%
and 1% respectively in 2004 [80]. Files are divided into chunks of 9,500kb
which an MD4 checksum associated with each chunk.
3.4.4 BitTorrent
Figure 3.7: Visualisation of a Typical BitTorrent Swarm
In July 2001, the first implementation of the BitTorrent protocol was released.
The BitTorrent protocol is designed to easily facilitate the distribution of files
to a very large number of downloaders with minimal load on the original
file source [81]. This is achieved through the downloaders uploading their
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completed parts of the entire file to other downloaders. A BitTorrent swarm is
made up of seeders, i.e., peers with complete copies of the content shared in
the swarm, and leechers, i.e., peers who are downloading the content. Due to
BitTorrent’s ease of use and minimal bandwidth requirements, it lends itself
as an ideal platform for the unauthorised distribution of copyrighted material.
This typically commences with a single source sharing large sized files to many
downloaders.
Based on global bandwidth usage, BitTorrent is the most popular P2P network
in use today. In 2005, D. Erman measured BitTorrent traffic to account for over
60% of the world’s bandwidth usage [82]. The BitTorrent protocol is designed
to easily facilitate the distribution of files to a potentially large number of
interested parties, i.e., other peers, with a minimal load on the original file
source, as outlined in the BitTorrent protocol specification. This is achieved
through the following steps:
1. The file is split up into a number of uniformly sized pieces or chunks
with typical chunk sizes generally ranging from 128kB to 4MB.
2. The initial source of the file creates a UTF-8 encoded “.torrent” metadata
file, which includes unique SHA-1 hash values for the entire file and
each of the file chunks, along with other required file information, e.g.,
filenames, chunk size, total file size, path information, client information,
comments etc.
3. This metadata file is then shared by the creator with other users
interested in acquiring the original content either through direct
distribution, e.g., email, instant messaging etc., or through the much
more common method of uploading onto a torrent indexing website,
such as ThePirateBay.org. Following the recent trend of maximising
decentralisation of the BitTorrent eco-system, many indexing websites
now only serve “magnet” URIs. These URIs enable the user to connect
to a distributed hash table, as outlined below, and acquire the metadata
file from other users.
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4. Users interested in downloading the available content must then
download this metadata file and open it using a BitTorrent client, such
as Azureus/Vuze or µTorrent.
5. The BitTorrent client is then tasked with identifying other peers who
are sharing the file uniquely identified in the metadata file, i.e., other
peers in the swarm. This includes identifying seeders, i.e., peers with
complete copies of the content shared in the swarm, and other leechers,
i.e., peers who are currently downloading the content, but are sharing the
completed chunks with others. This peer discovery is achieved through
a variety of methods including tracker communication, distributed hash
tables and peer exchange.
The success of the BitTorrent protocol can be attributed to uploaders incurring
no additional cost (besides their Internet connectivity costs) to share files
with many users. In practice, the original uploader needs only to stay
connected to the swarm until a sufficient number of leechers have one full
copy of the file between them. This is made possible through the leechers
uploading their completed chunks of the entire file to other downloaders.
Due to BitTorrent’s ease of use, minimal bandwidth requirements and
perceived Internet anonymity, it lends itself well as an ideal platform for the
unauthorised distribution of copyrighted material. Initially this distribution
consists of a single original source for sharing a large sized file between many
peers.
Each BitTorrent client must be able to identify a list of active peers in the same
swarm who have at least one piece of the content and is willing to share it, i.e.,
that has an available open connection and has enough bandwidth available to
upload. By the nature of the protocol, any peer that wishes to partake in a
swarm, must be able to communicate and share files with other active peers.
There are a number of methods that a client can attempt to discover new peers
which are in the swarm:
1. Tracker Communication – BitTorrent trackers maintain a list of seeders
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and leechers for each BitTorrent swarm they are currently tracking. Each
BitTorrent client will contact the tracker intermittently throughout the
download of a particular piece of content to report that they are still alive
on the network and to download a short list of new peers on the network.
2. Peer Exchange (PEX) – Peer Exchange is a BitTorrent Enhancement
Proposal (BEP) whereby when two peers are communicating, a subset of
their respective peer lists are shared during the communication.
3. Distributed Hash Tables – Within the confounds of the standard
BitTorrent specification, there is no intercommunication between peers
of different BitTorrent swarms. Azureus/Vuze and µTorrent contain
mutually exclusive implementations of distributed hash tables as part
of their standard client features. These DHTs maintain a list of all
active peers using each client and enables cross-swarm communication
between peers. Each peer in the DHT is associated with the swarm(s) in
which it is currently an active participant.
Figure 3.8: µTorrent Screenshot.
Due to the fact that the protocol is openly documented, numerous BitTorrent
clients are available besides the official BitTorrent clients produced by
BitTorrent Inc. [83], such as Azureus/Vuze, µTorrent, Shareaza, BitLord,
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BitComet. Each client maintains its list of known active peers in a different
manner. Different client parameters such as when the client decides to close
an inactive connection and how the upload capacity is distributed results
in some clients being more performant than others. In 2010 Iliofotou et al.
conducted a large scale measurement study involving more than 11 million
clients across over six thousand ISPs comparing the real world performance
of the two most popular BitTorrent clients, Vuze and µTorrent [84]. It was
found that µTorrent is on average 16% faster than Vuze.
3.5 Anti-Infringement Measures
With the popularity of acquiring copyrighted content illegally, many content
producers are employing a number of technical solutions in an attempt to
combat online piracy. In recent years, a number of anti-P2P companies have
started to offer their services to the content producing industries.
3.5.1 Attacks on Leechers
In 2008, Dhungel et al. identified some of the techniques employed to interfere
with unauthorised downloading and measured how successful attacks on
BitTorrent leechers were [85]. Two different attack vectors were identified:
1. Fake-Block Attack – In this attack, the goal is to prolong the download
time for a particular leecher. This is achieved by offering fake blocks of
the desired content. While this is easily identified client-side through
the hashing of the completed block, nonetheless time is wasted as the
hashing can only occur once the 128kB to 4MB block is completely
downloaded. The download could be further delayed if the peer decides
to redownload this block, or any other block, from an attacker.
2. Uncooperative Peer Attack – In this scenario, the attacker joins a swarm
and establishes connections with as many peers as possible without ever
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sharing any blocks of the content. With each peer generally maintaining
in the order of ten active connections at a time, taking up one or more
of these valuable connections can have a significant impact on the
performance of the user’s download.
3.5.2 Pollution
In 2005, Liang et al. identified that one way employed to combat unauthorised
file-sharing of copyrighted content is to spam the network with large volumes
of bogus or polluted files [86]. With many P2P networks relying on a simple
metadata (movie title, artist, song title, etc.) keyword search to locate desired
content, polluting the P2P ecosystem with bogus files might be seen as a
useful copyright infringement countermeasure to copyright holders. Due to
each piece of content having as many as 50,000 different variations available,
polluting the system with fake versions of the content can be a simple process
merely requiring a user to rename a bogus file with the desired popular title.
3.6 Forensic Process/State of the Art
3.6.1 Network Crawling
Crawling a P2P network attempts to discover each node participating in a
given network. Depending on the network design, total peer enumeration
may be possible, with decentralised networks generally proving easier to
crawl. For example, Napster can only be crawled through the responses
returned by querying the system for specified content whereas Gnutella
can be crawled through the exploitation of the ping/pong peer discovery
messages built into the protocol [87]. Network crawling may attempt to find
all the nodes sharing a specified piece of content, or attempt to enumerate the
size and geolocation of the entire network.
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3.6.2 Deep Packet Inspection
Deep packet inspection attempts to classify packets as belonging to a given
network. Traditionally this task was deemed relatively simple to implement
as specific applications generally had a specific port number assigned to it.
P2P traffic is becoming harder to identify due to port obfuscation, encryption
and tunnelling. DPI has evolved to take packet flows into consideration when
attempting to identify traffic. A combination of per-packet sampling and
per-flow sampling is generally used to aid in identification. In 2013, Khalife
et al., deployed an OpenDPI testbed in an attempt to identify encrypted P2P
traffic [20]. Incorporating packet flow analysis greatly improved the accuracy
of the detection of P2P traffic, as can be seen in Figure 3.9.
Figure 3.9: Flow accuracy results for P2P traffic as a function of the packet
detection number
3.6.3 Identifying Copyrighted Content
In 2008, Nasraoui et al. proposed a system to identify copyrighted content
(movies, TV shows, ebooks, audio files, etc.) [88]. It was proposed that a
database of known file hashes and metadata could be maintained by law
enforcement agencies facilitating the identification of any content. In order
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for such a system to be complete, it would require cooperation from content
producers and most likely a large number of volunteers in a wiki-style
approach to maintenance. In this model, each audio or video file would have
to be downloaded and manually verified to be a copy of the original. The
hash of the verified file would then be added to the shared database.
An alternative to the per-file hashing approach has been developed by
Audible Magic Corp. The company has patented an audio and video
identification methodology for identifying any piece of content through an
heuristic approach [89]. This system creates a “fingerprint” of the content
not based on the digital signature, but instead based on the recognition of
the audio wave patterns produced by playing the file. This facilitates the
identification of known content, irrespective of the codec, bitrate or metadata
of the file.
3.7 Forensic Counter-measures
Due to privacy concerns from the monitoring of P2P file-sharing, some users
attempt to circumvent detection through the use of forensic countermeasures.
Many ISPs monitor their network traffic and perform throttling or “traffic
shaping” in order to curtail bandwidth hogging services, such as P2P
file-sharing.
3.7.1 Anonymous Proxies
Some users of P2P file-sharing employ anonymous proxy services, such as
Tor (The Onion Router) [90] or I2P (Invisible Internet Project) [91]. These
services are distributed overlay networks designed to anonymise TCP-based
applications. Each packet sent from a client operating on the network is
encrypted and subsequently bounced through a random number of nodes
before reaching its destination server. The response is then sent back through
another random path [92]. There are currently no methods available to reverse
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engineer a users actual IP address from the traffic originating from a Tor
exit node. However, in 2012, Gilad et al. outlined a number a methods for
detecting whether a given client is using Tor or not [93].
3.7.2 Encrypted Traffic
The use of encryption helps to overcome some of the network forensic
investigations utilising packet sniffing or deep packet inspection. An number
of P2P networks employ encryption methods for all communication, e.g, SSL.
Many of the tools deployed by ISPs and network monitoring companies rely
on DPI and payload heuristics to analyse network traffic and this encryption
renders these approaches ineffective [94].
3.7.3 IP Blocking
To avoid detection, some users employ custom firewall tools, such as
PeerBlock, PeerGuardian, Moblock, etc., to ban any incoming or outgoing
communication with specific other users [95]. These tools accept a list of
defined “bad” IP addresses. Users can create their own lists or acquire
lists of known bad IP addresses from numerous online services. One such
service is iBlocklists [96], which allows users to download lists of known IP
address ranges for a number of content producing companies, governmental
organisations, educational institutions, anti-piracy companies, etc. Such
lists can contain over 222,000 IP address ranges and in total can cover over
796,128,149 IP addresses [97].
3.8 Malware Risks on P2P Networks
For almost as long as P2P networks have been used for file-sharing, they
have been exploited for the propagation of viruses and malware. Keyword
based metadata searching systems are most vulnerable to attack due to their
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simplified searching method. For example, a user may easily download
and attempt to play an executable file as opposed to the music file he was
attempting to download. Users can be easily tricked into downloading these
files, by renaming the malware file with a desirable popular artist name, e.g.,
“Katy Perry.exe”. In 2006, Shin et al. found that over 12% of Kazaa client hosts
were infected by over 40 different viruses, with 15-22% of the total crawled
data in their investigation containing viral files [98]. The Kazaa installation file
also came bundled with malware. During the install process, and in order to
complete the installation, the user has to agree to installing some third-party
software alongside the Kazaa installation, as can be seen in Figure 3.10.
Figure 3.10: Kazaa end user licence agreement
In an attempt to propagate itself, many malwares will connect to a popular
P2P network and attempt to get other users to download and infect their
machines. Many of these self-propagating malwares will cleverly respond
with a dynamic filename based on whatever keywords the incoming request
query contains [99].
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3.9 Summary and Discussion
In this chapter, P2P file-sharing systems and their differing design
characteristics were introduced. Many of these popular networks are
used mainly for the unauthorised distribution of copyrighted material which
costs the content producing industry billions of dollars every year. Some
of the methods used for investigating these networks were also introduced.
These generally involve either building a bespoke network crawling tool or
deploying a hardware/software network packet analysis system.
3.9.1 Weaknesses of Current Investigative Approaches
If different investigative bodies, e.g., law enforcement from different countries,
wish to investigate the same network, each body needs to start from scratch
in the development of their own tool. As a result, from a P2P cybercrime
investigation perspective, a significant amount of time is wasted globally in the
duplication of developmental, investigate and analysis efforts in an attempt to
reach a common goal. The universal P2P network investigation framework
described in Chapter ?? introduces solutions to some of these issues.
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CHAPTER
FOUR
BOTNET INVESTIGATION
4.1 Introduction
In the past, cyberattackers required high-end computer equipment coupled
with high bandwidth Internet connections to accomplish their goals. In
recent years, high bandwidth at home and workplace broadband Internet
connections have become common-place. This has resulted in these computers
being targeted by criminals to create large, global distributed systems, i.e.,
botnets, to perform their bidding. The software robots, or bots, which form
these distributed systems are controlled remotely by the criminal attacker, or
botmaster. The paradigm of modern botnet cybercrime involves enslaving
compromised computers as a strategic criminal asset. Traditionally viruses
were created with the intention to attack and destroy infected systems, but
now malware has evolved to gain control of infected machines and use these
machines to build a global network to perpetrate cybercrimes [100].
Botnets have become the tool of choice to conduct a number of online
attacks, e.g., DDoS, malware distribution, email spamming, phishing,
advertisement click fraud, brute-force password attacks, etc. Criminals
involved in conducting their craft online all share one common goal; not to get
caught. Botnet design, as a result, has moved away from the traditional, more
traceable and easily blocked client/server paradigm towards a decentralised
P2P based communication system. P2P Internet communication technologies
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Figure 4.1: Sample CAPTCHA from the reCAPTCHA online service and its
automated book scanning source text
lend themselves well to use in the world of botnet propagation and control
due to the level of anonymity they award the botmaster. For the cybercrime
investigator, identifying the perpetrator of these P2P controlled crimes has
become significantly more difficult. This chapter outlines the state-of-the-art
in P2P botnet investigation.
The prevalence of large, global botnets has resulted in many online services
deploying human authentication systems to reduce or eliminate automated
registration for forums, email accounts, social networks, etc. These systems
aim to prevent automated botnet login attempts resulting in password
cracking or spam. The most common test for telling whether any given visitor
to a website is human or machine is to employ “Completely Automated Public
Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart” (CAPTCHA) verification.
The test involves presenting the user with a string of obfuscated characters
and requires the user to identify the often scrambled words in order to
proceed. Figure 4.1 shows a sample word taken from a text with unreliable
results from regular optical character recognition algorithms [101]. It has now
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Figure 4.2: Simple Trojan Horse Architecture Controlling Multiple Computers
become common to use these scanned words which are difficult automated
recognition to verify human website usage. The human delivered results from
these CAPTCHA systems can feed directly into text scanning and recognition
projects, such as Google Books.
4.2 Botnet Architectures
Arguably, the simplest implementation of botnet technology involves an
attacker manually taking control of each victim’s computer using a remote
trojan horse based attack, as shown in Figure 4.2 [102]. In this model, the
attacker had one-to-one direct control of the victim’s machine. The target of
the attack would generally be the user of the infected machine as the attacker
is capable of capturing keystrokes, executing any applications, intercepting
print jobs, accessing local or network files and destroying the victim’s
operating system or system configuration. From an anonymity standpoint,
this design has significant privacy issues for the attacker. Any investigation
of the trojan’s network traffic would easily reveal the attacker’s IP address,
which could subsequently be resolved back to reveal his identity.
Subseven was one of the most popular trojan horse systems (alternatively
referred to as Sub7 or Sub7Server). It consisted of a client trojan horse virus
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Figure 4.3: Subseven Control Panel
and a server or control panel to facilitate the attack. Released in 1999, it
targeted vulnerable Windows machines [103]. The types of commands the
attacker could execute can be seen in Figure 4.3.
4.2.1 Client/Server Botnet Design
The simplest botnet architecture relies on a central server to control all nodes
on the network, often referred to as a centralised design. When a bot comes
online, it registers its availability with the server, which in turn issues the bot
with commands for the work it must complete. These Command and Control
(C&C) servers are directly controlled by the botmaster. The architecture of
this C&C based system contains a single controlling server with multiple
compromised machines communicating with it, as outlined in Figure 4.4.
55
Figure 4.4: Command and Control Server Botnet Network Architecture
Traditional botnet design was centred on a client/server paradigm (see Figure
4.4). Using this model, the botmaster issues requests to the HTTP (regular
website based communication) or Internet Relay Chat (IRC) based C&C server.
In the case of IRC, each connecting bot will pick a randomised nickname for
the chatroom and as a result, if necessary, the server has the ability to issue
unique commands to each bot. The use of a C&C server eliminates the need
for the botmaster’s computer to remain online in order to distribute the latest
orders to the entire botnet. C&C servers also award the botmaster an added
level of anonymity from detection.
An advantage to using the HTTP based design over the IRC design, is that
the bots themselves do not need to be continuously connected to the server
[104]. Instead, the client-side HTTP bot software, which runs on the infected
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nodes, is programmed to periodically ”check-in” with the C&C server in order
to get its latest commands. In the IRC based model, the bots remain connected
to the IRC channel while online. This leaves the system vulnerable to IRC
based investigation and manipulation by law enforcement or other forensic
investigators.
The main concern with this simple client/server model is that it leaves the
botnet vulnerable to a single point of failure. To counteract this, multiple
C&C servers may be used optionally in conjunction with a dynamic Domain
Name System (DNS) service, such as DynDNS [105] or No IP [106]. The
dynamic hostnames required are hard-coded into the bot software, enabling
the botmaster to quickly and easily swap in a new command and control
server when needed. This is achieved by simply updating the IP addresses
associated with the dynamic DNS provider ensuring no disruption of the
botnet’s regular operation. Cloud services lend themselves well to being
exploited for running C&C servers and offer the botmaster the ability to
quickly and easily change not only the IP address, but the geographic location
of the C&C servers frequently. In 2009, Amazon discovered that its Elastic
Compute Cloud (EC2) was being used by a new version of the Zeus botnet for
its C&C functionalities [107].
The weak point of the original HTTP/IRC based command and control centre
botnet design, as it can be seen in Figure 4.4, is that there is a single point
of failure. If law enforcement or any other third party wished to destroy the
botnet, the command and control server can be targeted and the botnet can be
effectively destroyed, i.e., left without any commands or work to complete.
The next evolution of botnet design incorporated multiple C&C servers to
attempt to alleviate the strain and weaknesses of a single server design, as
it can be seen in Figure 4.5. In this model, each bot in the system will register
and check-in with multiple C&C servers.
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Figure 4.5: Evolution of botnet architecture to eliminate single point of failure
Figure 4.6: Typical botnet topology with commands optionally routed through
a C&C server.
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4.2.2 P2P Design
The design of botnet architecture has continuously evolved over the last
number of years to improve the performance and attack resilience of the
system, while awarding a greater degree of anonymity to the botmaster.
A natural progression of the client/server design involved expansion to
incorporate as many C&C servers as possible. Further extension of this model
involves utilising P2P technologies in the architecture of the systems. This
effectively turns each bot in the network into a C&C server. This results in
every active node in the network having the ability to communicate with a
subset of all the other nodes in the same botnet. Commands and updates are
passed from peer to peer in a manner that eliminates the need for controlling
servers. As a result, the single point of failure of the client/server botnet
design is effectively eliminated [108].
Decentralised botnet design relies on a DHT to record all the active nodes on
the network [109]. In order for any new bot to participate in the network,
it must have an avenue available to it to initially connect to this DHT. This
is generally done through the hardcoding of an initial “seed” list or a list of
bootstrapping servers. The seed list is a local cache of IP addresses which
are more likely active nodes in the network. A node attempting to join
the network can contact either a seed or one of the bootstrapping servers
to connect to the DHT and begin regular operations. Without some initial
hardcoded bootstrapping method to connect to the DHT, the only other
completely decentralised option available to a P2P system is to employ
random address probing . While this may initially appear an unlikely method,
recall that discovering a single node connected to the DHT is sufficient to
join the system and some of the DHTs involved can contain millions of active
nodes. In practice, Dinger et al. [110] found that limiting the randomised
scan rate to 100 packets per second resulted in locating a BitTorrent DHT peer
within ten minutes with a probability of ≥94%.
Botnet developers are continuously updating and improving botnet design.
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In 2013, Memon et al. proposed a new botnet system, named Tsunami,
which attempts to eliminate the bespoke bootstrapping server weakness
of decentralised P2P botnet design by parasitically transmitting all botnet
communications on the existing global Kad network [111]. The Kad network
is a DHT based P2P network with over 4 million users most commonly used
by numerous P2P file-sharing applications, such as eMule and MLDonkey.
Commands are sent from the botmaster to any active bots using the “lookup”
messages in Kad. This facilitated a hidden payload instruction up to 106
bits in length. The lookup command in Kad is automatically passed from
node-to-node in a similar method to that of querying the Gnutella P2P
file-sharing network, as described in Section 3.4.2. It was found that Tsunami
could reach 75% of its bots within 4 minutes and receive responses back from
99% of these bots.
4.2.3 Hybrid Design
A hybrid botnet topology builds upon the P2P design by promoting particular
high uptime and high bandwidth nodes to “supernode” status, in a similar
fashion to Gnutella outlined in Section 3.4.2. This results in a two tiered model
with client bots and servant bots [112]. The servant bots are the only ones
receiving the commands directly from the botmaster and are responsible both
for spreading those orders throughout the network and are responsible for the
maintenance of the network itself [113].
4.3 Botnet Lifecycle
For most botmasters, the botnet lifecycle starts with the configuration of the
botnet client (infecting malware to run on victims’ machines) and the botnet
controlling server (responsible for the dissemination of the latest updates and
commands). There are numerous software solutions available to criminals
wishing to create their own botnet, requiring varying degrees of technical
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knowledge and costs:
1. Buy or rent an existing botnet – There are numerous avenues available
to the criminal to buy or rent partial or entire botnets. Botnets are rented
or sold for differing prices depending on the associated “quality”, i.e.,
size, node uptime, bandwidth, latency, geolocation, etc. This option
requires minimal technical knowledge and the perpetration of the crime
can commence almost instantaneously. This model shares many of the
characteristics as renting cloud computing resources from legitimate
providers. Minimal upfront time and money is required on behalf of the
botmaster to get started.
2. Buy pre-developed botnet software – This option will supply the
criminal with developed software. This software is configured to
spread the client malware via P2P networks, email attachments, instant
messaging, etc. The cost of purchasing such a system increases with
the decreased likelihood that the client executable will be discovered by
anti-virus software and the broader the operating system compatibility.
Choosing this option will allow the criminal to create numerous different
botnets if desired, based on the purchased technology. Some technical
knowledge and time is required in order to spread and infect the desired
number of nodes. A significant downside to this option is that the
same software will likely be sold to numerous criminals who may
each create several botnets. The more prevalent the software is, the
higher the likelihood that the malware will be detected or reported to
anti-virus/malware detection providers. In this instance, all botnets
based on this software may be rendered useless. However, in order for
this to occur, all victims must update their virus definitions and remove
the infection.
3. Develop customised bespoke botnet software – This is the most resilient
option against detection, but obviously requires the highest amount of
technical ability. Before any development can commence, a vulnerability
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must first be discovered in a popular operating system, browser, e-mail
client or other common piece of software or hardware. This vulnerability
facilitates the infection of the victims’ machines, as outlined in greater
detail in Section 4.3.1. Assuming a functional botnet client can be
developed, the botmaster still has the same task as described above in
spreading the infection to as many victims as required.
Once the botmaster has the required software (often a PHP/MySQL driven
back-end installed on a command and control server), the configuration of
the infecting malware must take place. Each newly infected machine must
accept new orders, update the bot client software, send information back to the
botmaster and potentially distribute orders with other known nodes in the P2P
system. This configuration file will contain settings and required operational
information, such as trusted C&C servers, update servers, DHT information,
communication frequencies, resource usage limits, etc., [114]. In a purchased
or rented system, this configuration step will likely have been completed by
the seller.
To ensure maximum flexibility, any hardcoded host information, such as
the list of trusted C&C servers, will generally be included using a dynamic
hostname supplied by dynamic DNS providers such as DynDNS [105]. This
allows the botmaster to regularly shutdown or move the C&C servers without
needing to update any of the bots on the network. To achieve this move,
the botmaster merely changes the IP address associated with each dynamic
domain name supplied in the configuration file.
A typical botnet deployment lifecycle from a new vulnerable host’s
point-of-view can be seen in Figure 4.7 [115]. Each of the indicated steps
are outlined in greater detail in Sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.5. Most botnets aim to
achieve, from the point-of-view of the users of the effected machines, no
discernible performance reduction to the regular expected operational speed.
The bot’s client can be configured to intelligently use only available resources
and as a result, potentially never get discovered. A user with what appears
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Figure 4.7: Typical Botnet Lifecycle from a Victim’s Point-of-View
to be a fully functional computer may never decide to install or run anti-virus
software.
4.3.1 Spreading and Infection Phase
In order for a botmaster to execute his desired acts, the bot malware client
must be running on a significant number of infected machines. In order for
a machine to get infected with the malware, either some user interaction
is required or a software vulnerability is exploited in order for the binary
executable to run [116].
The infection or “recruitment” phase is referred to as the phase in which a
clean host is infected by a bot binary and, as a result, becomes a member of the
botnet [117]. This generally involves some malicious executable compromising
a host through any available means, e.g., taking advantage of a software or
hardware exploit through social engineering, instant messaging, unprotected
network shares, malicious email attachments or the mimicking of desirable
content on download sites or on P2P file-sharing networks [118]. In 2007,
the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) conducted
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Figure 4.8: Typical Malware Attack Vectors
research into the infection vectors of botnets and found that the most common
infection method was through browser exploits [119]. The complete results of
their findings are shown in Figure 4.8.
Once a new machine is infected, many bots attempt to self-propagate by
sending emails to the victim’s address book, instant message contacts, etc.
Some bots will also connect to popular P2P file-sharing systems in an attempt
to dupe users into downloading the infection.
4.3.2 Secondary Code Injection Phase
Many of the attack vectors for the malware involve a memory buffer overflow
exploit in software. Due to the nature of the attack, it is common that the
initial “break-in” or “dropper” binary might not contain the entire bot client.
It may merely serve the function of gaining the required operating system
access rights to facilitate the install of the client software [120]. During this
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phase, the binary will download and install the latest version of the botnet
client onto the infected machine. Seeing as a common method for malware
distribution is to email the malware as an executable or to entice a download
from a P2P file-sharing network, it is also common for the version of the
malware distributed to be out of date. For example, the default behaviour
of most P2P file-sharing systems is to automatically share all downloaded
files. As a result of this potentially outdated software, it is also during this
secondary phase that the bot software will update itself to the latest version
from the C&C server.
4.3.3 Command and Control Phase
It is during the C&C phase that a newly infected computer will become
part of the botnet. A traditional client-server bot, once installed on a new
machine, will immediately attempt to “phone home” through an IRC network
or contacting a HTTP C&C server. Decentralised P2P bots are distributed
with a predefined bootstrapping method to connect to the relevant DHT.
Once connected, the newly compromised machine will ask one of its peers
for the latest command. Some of the P2P bots require that a specific port is
open for the peers to be able to communicate with each other [121]. Through
the deployment of a firewall, many of the unnecessarily open ports on any
given machine will be blocked. Any new application that attempts to access
the network for any reason can also be flagged to the user, e.g., immediately
after a recent infection of the botnet malware. Newer versions of the bot client
software will not use a predefined port number to aid in avoiding detection.
There are two different ways to spread a command in a botnet system, namely
push and pull. IRC based bots belong to the push-based category as they sit in
an IRC chat room listening for a new command. HTTP based bots periodically
check with the server to verify if there is any new work. P2P bots can do both
as they send and receive commands to/from other bots.
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4.3.4 Attack Phase
The attack phase is the most important in the botnet lifecycle from the
botmaster’s perspective. The purposes of designing, developing and
spreading the botnet client malware onto as many machines as possible is
to conduct whatever distributed illegal activities the botmaster has in mind.
When a bot receives a command, so long as it remains online it will execute
that command until one of the following two events occur:
1. A predefined stopping condition is met – This condition may be when
a specified execution time has elapsed or when the objective goal
is accomplished, e.g., the taking down of a website or service, or a
password having been cracked, etc.
2. A new order is received – Any new order received will overwrite the
current operation. Modern botnet design facilitates the execution of
multiple orders simultaneously and each job may need to be manually
ordered to cease.
Examples of the types of attacks conducted by botmasters and real-world
monetary rewards for each are outlined in greater detail in Section 4.5.
4.3.5 Update and Maintenance Phase
Botmasters have the ability to issue update commands to their entire system
of slave machines. Due to the interest in botnet detection and investigation,
the attackers need to have a facility to upgrade their tools. This stage allows
the botmaster to update the existing binaries and/or configuration to make the
entire system more resilient to new digital forensic techniques.
The maintenance phase of the botnet lifecycle involves feeding execution,
uptime and update information back to the botmaster. Figure 4.9 shows some
of the information available to a botmaster including the number of currently
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Figure 4.9: Screenshot from the Blackenergy Botnet C&C Server
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active nodes, the churn rate per hour or day and the total number of detected
bots [114].
4.4 Underground Economy
Given that financial gain is perhaps the biggest driving force in the growth of
botnet technologies and volume of attacks, it was a natural progression that
a large underground botnet enabled economy would develop. Numerous
vendors, merchants, malware authors and customers are involved in the
daily trade of personal information, attacks, spamming services and botnet
technologies. Among the network of cybercriminals, a vibrant market has
emerged trading in compromised credit cards and financial information.
Much of this collected information would have been harvested by botnets.
Those botmasters who target the collection of these financial details are
usually unable to extract the funds directly from the accounts, so they usually
sell them at a fraction of their value to experienced criminals or organisations
who have a greater infrastructure available to them [100].
Much research has been conducted into how this large underground market
of trading criminal tools and technologies can be stopped, or at least
hindered. Specifically to the trade of botnets, one method proposed to stem
the profitability of this economy was proposed by Li et al. in 2009 [122].
This method suggests that by introducing virtual bots into the system, an
uncertainty level in the performance of the network is introduced, e.g., a
botmaster needs a specific amount of active nodes to perform a DDoS attack
on a server and if many of the nodes currently active in the botnet are fake, the
goal cannot be accomplished. This makes the task of achieving the optimal
botnet attack size infeasible for botnet operators and will ultimately effect
their profitability.
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4.4.1 Valuation
A significant underground economy of selling, trading or renting botnets has
developed in recent years. A botnet with 10,000 infected machines can fetch
approximately $300-$800, depending on the geolocation of the nodes and the
quality of the nodes. This quality is determined by the nodes being infected
solely by a single botnet client and the nodes’ uptime and internet connection
speeds. Botnets with infected nodes based in the United States are the most
valuable at $125 per 1,000, with European based botnets valued at $35 per
1,000 and Asian botnets valued at just $13 per 1,000 [123]. In 2010, Danchev
found that the average price for renting a botnet is $67 for 24 hours and $9 for
hourly access [124]. Often more money can be made through the renting of a
botnet to multiple customers concurrently, referred to as “Botnet as a Service
(BaaS)” [125].
4.4.2 Spamming
In 2010, it was estimated that over 89% of all emails sent were spam, resulting
in over 262 billion spam emails being sent per day. In 2013, dealing with
the volume of spam will cost over $338 billion in network bandwidth and
infrastructure costs in 2013. The majority of spam originates from botnets and
it is estimated that 80-85% of all spam is produced by 6-10 huge botnets [126].
Almost all of this spam is illegally distributed under current laws in North
America and Europe. Rao et al. estimate that the sending of spam is a $200
million per year business for the botmasters [127].
In 2011, Stone-Gross et al. analysed a popular underground web-based
forum known as “Spamdot.biz” [123]. The forum required significant social
engineering to gain access, with the authors requiring a reference from at
least three existing members of the forum before they were granted access. It
was found that this forum was used by almost 2,000 users to advertise their
spamming services and to buy/sell information. E-mail address lists were
worth between $25 and $50 per one million, contingent on the geolocation of
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the users and the proportion of addresses belonging to email providers with
stronger spam filters, e.g., Gmail, Hotmail or Yahoo.
Kanich et al. found in one specific instance that a major spam campaign
involving the sending of almost 350 million emails using the Storm botnet,
only made $2,731.88 in revenue for the advertiser [128]. The campaign
required over 75,000 active bots in the network to send the emails and
resulted in 28 purchases from the associated online pharmacy website, or a
conversion rate of just 0.0000081%. All but one of these purchases were for
male pharmaceutical products, such as Viagra and Cialis, and the average
purchase price was close to $100. The authors continue to estimate that the
cost of such a campaign would be in the order of $25,000 and as a result,
speculate that the botmasters of the Storm botnet may be the purveyors of the
pharmacies advertised.
An obvious approach for ISPs and email providers to blocking spam emails
is to refuse communication, or blacklist, known IP addresses that are found
to be sending high volumes of messages. In the traditional spamming model,
whereby a spammer hires a server or number of servers to send out the
emails, this approach can prove very effective. However, blacklisting is not
an efficient approach for blocking spam originating from infected nodes in
a botnet. Any single node in the botnet is most likely a regular home or
business user who is likely to get assigned a new IP address regularly, due to
the common ISP practice of DHCP based IP address allocation. As a result,
blocking every IP address that is found guilty of sending spam will result in
the email service provider ultimately blocking a high number of legitimate
users (who innocently may have been assigned an IP address previously used
by an infected bot).
4.4.3 Phishing
Phishing generally involves an attempt to trick the user of an infected machine
to enter personal or confidential information through faux webpages [104].
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These often convincing data harvesting webpages are injected into the user’s
regular browsing habits, popped up in their browser or OS or sent as links
in emails. Phishing attacks are also commonly distributed by email spam.
Webpages emulating those of a bank, online payment provider or lottery
are common themes used in email based phishing attacks to entice the
unsuspecting user into parting with valuable personal information.
Links have been found between distributed online phishing attacks collecting
credit card information and the funding of terrorism. In one example, three
men were arrested in the United Kingdom in 2008 and were found guilty
of funding the terrorist organisation, al-Qaeda [100]. The trio were found to
be in the possession of over 37,000 stolen credit card numbers, along with
associated personal information from victims. They had made over $3.5
million in fraudulent charges and had purchased over 250 airline tickets.
4.4.4 Scamming the Scammers
In 2010, Herley et al. documented that a large proportion of the underground
economy has evolved offering bogus botnet software, email addresses,
botnets, etc., to unsuspecting criminals [129]. The presence of these scammers
ultimately represents a tax on every “honest” transaction, where neither party
might be familiar with the other. It was also found that a two-tier underground
economy now exists. The top tier consists of elite cybercriminals where their
organisation, alliances and trust is established. At this tier, transactions take
place between known or “reputable” criminals. The lower tier, generally
conducted on IRC marketplaces, is occupied by criminal newcomers without
any experiential skills or alliances and are easily cheated out of their money
by fake sellers or “rippers”, who have no intention of providing the goods or
services offered.
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4.5 Botnet Powered Attacks
As proven by the Anonymous “hacktivist” attacks in recent years, innocent
victims’ infected machines do not solely contribute to the the distributed
power of botnet attacks. Regular Internet users with shared political or
activist views can voluntarily decide to contribute their processing power to
a collaborative cause. Partaking in the Anonymous attacks involved users
downloading and configuring an open source network stress testing tool
called “Low Orbit Ion Cannon” (LOIC). Alternatively, users can donate their
computational power via a JavaScript-based version facilitating anyone who
visits the site to participate in the attack [130]. Regular P2P file-sharing
networks, such as BitTorrent, can also be manipulated by malicious
users to aid in the execution of a DDoS attack through the exploitation
of vulnerabilities in the protocol and operation of the network [131]. In a
cyberwarfare scenario, it is conceivable that citizens of countries with limited
computational infrastructure or supporters of terrorist organisations could
similarly be called upon to donate their systems to aid in a collaborated attack
on an enemy’s infrastructure.
The potential for attacks originating from a growing number of sources is a
concern for the security of many nations across the globe. In 2012, Amoroso
et. al defined five possible motivations behind cyberattacks [132]:
1. Country-sponsored warfare – This is whereby national infrastructure is
attacked by enemy cyber forces in an attempt to disable critical resources
of the opposing country in a similar manner to traditional physical
warfare. The intensity of this attack is only limited by the resources
and devotion of the attacking nation. In a P2P botnet facilitated attack,
citizens could voluntarily donate their computing power towards the
national goals in a similar manner to the Anonymous attacks outlined
above.
2. Terrorist Attack – Groups driven by terrorist motivations could quickly
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gain sufficient funding and expertise to conduct their attacks. Also in
this scenario, regular Internet users could partake in a terrorist operation
without requiring any skill or expertise by donating their regular
computer equipment to the attack.
3. Commercially motivated attack – Competing companies might target
their competitors’ e-commerce infrastructure in order to prevent regular
users from purchasing anything from their online stores. A popular
e-commerce site being taken offline has the added effect of harming the
victim company’s reputation in their customers’ eyes.
4. Financially driven criminal attack – These types of attacks could target
individual computer users by recording their Internet banking details,
online payment services and other financial services. Companies can also
be targeted with extortion threats against their online infrastructure.
5. Hacking – This scenario generally involves an individual or group
of hackers attacking targets motivated by little more than mischief or
attaining online recognition of their achievements.
A number of popular botnet powered attacks are outlined in the following
subsections:
4.5.1 Infection
Often botnet developers integrate some method of self-propagation into their
design. Bots can scan for and infect more vulnerable computers with network
or browser based exploits. Increasingly, web-based infection mechanisms have
been observed online, whereby drone machines infect legitimate websites with
a drive-by exploit and consequently, visitors to those websites can become
infected [100]. These website based attacks are often targeted towards popular
websites to try to infect as many web users as possible.
The prevalence of web based malware distribution has resulted in most of the
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Figure 4.10: Google Chrome Malware Warning
major web browsers implementing malware detection to aid in the protection
of their users. A sample browser warning is shown in Figure 4.10.
4.5.2 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks (DDoS)
Distributed Denial of Service attacks are attempts to overload or monopolise a
machine or web service resulting in the resource becoming unavailable for its
intended purpose. The first DDoS attack occurred in the summer of 1999 and
ranged from several hundred to more than two thousand computers [133].
This type of attack can result in significant financial losses for their targets, as
their web services are rendered useless for the duration of the attack. While
many DDoS attacks result in the target being effectively offline for a certain
period of time, “kinetic world” cyberattacks also exist through firmware code
injection into physical hardware resulting in destroyed routers, firewalls,
motherboards, etc.
The first DDoS attacks were motivated by petty online fights on IRC channels
but soon shifted to monetary motivations with extortion of online gambling,
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e-commerce and pornography websites in 2003. These attacks evolved into
politically motivated attacks against national infrastructures in 2007 [133].
In December 2010, the Anonymous “hacktivist” group launched “Operation
Payback” in response to the controversy of the attempted take-down of
the whistle-blowing website, Wikileaks [134]. The operation involved a
coordinated DDoS attack on the financial organisations (e.g. MasterCard,
Visa, Paypal), Wikileaks’s DNS provider and political and legal websites
involved in the controversy. LOIC is the network stress testing application
that was used by Anonymous to accomplish its DDoS attacks. LOIC was
utilised as a botnet whereby individual users download the client application
and voluntarily contribute their computing resources to the collective attack
of targets instigated by Anonymous.
!lazor default targethost=www.moneybookers.com subsite=/ speed=3
threads=15 method=tcp wait=false random=true checked=false
message=Sweet_dreams_from_AnonOPs port=80 start
Snippet 4.1: Example Low Orbit Ion Cannon Instruction
One example attack command sent by Anonymous to the LOIC bots
targeting the online payment provider Moneybookers.com and the included
parameters can be seen in Snippet 4.1 [130]. This particular attack was focused
on overloading the Moneybookers.com web server running on TCP port 80,
with each bot running 15 concurrent threads to the server and repeating the
request every 3 seconds without waiting for any reply from the server.
Botnet driven DDoS attacks are also commonly used for extortion. In this
scenario, a website or service is sent a threatening demand and must pay
extortion or else be faced with their website being taken offline. A sample
extortion threat is shown in Figure 4.11 [124].
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Figure 4.11: DDoS Extortion Example
4.5.3 Espionage
An infected machine is in complete control of the botmaster and often the
intended targets of the criminal activity are the home or corporate owners
of the compromised computer. Local documents, passwords, keystrokes,
financial and personal information are all desirable material that is capable of
being sent back to the controller of the bot. In a similar vein to the original
trojan horse viruses described above, desktop screenshots and webcam
snapshots have been observed getting relayed to the botmaster [100].
4.5.4 Proxies
Many botnet systems have proxy capabilities which effectively let the
botmaster tunnel their internet traffic through one or more of the zombie
machines. This can help facilitate anonymity for the botmaster and aid in
the evasion of capture from the authorities in a similar vein to anonymous
proxies, as outlined in Section 3.7.1.
4.5.5 Clickthrough Fraud
“Clickthrough fraud”, often referred to as just “click fraud”, involves
automatically gathering hits, advertising impressions and advertising clicks
on specific websites operated by the cybercriminal. As each bot on the P2P
network has a unique IP address, each infected machine appears to the
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advertising network provider (e.g. Google Adwords) as though it is any other
unique visitor to the website. Generally a subset of the entire botnet will
“choose” to click on the advertising available on the site, emulating regular
visitor usage in an attempt to avoid detection. Advertisers are forced to trust
that the advertising engine providers detect and prevent clickthrough fraud
even though the engines still get paid for every undetected fraudulent click
[135].
4.5.6 Cyber Warfare
Cyberattacks on critical domestic or wartime infrastructure, e.g. power, water,
communication and emergency systems, could bring a country and much of
its military coordination to its knees during a time of war. Next generation
warfare will involve coordinated attacks on two fronts; both “traditional”
or “kinetic” ground, sea and air based fighting and attempting to remotely
destroy a nation’s cyber-infrastructure.
In July 2009, several government and business websites in the United States
and South Korea were reportedly invaded. Initial suspicion was focused on
North Korea as a source of these attacks, though no conclusive evidence was
discovered [136]. The rules and principles that govern physical warfare are
largely dictated by easy to comprehend physical laws and limitations. Due
to the fact that the majority of cyberwarfare attacks are conducted online,
physical limitations, such as distance between warring nations, becomes
almost irrelevant [137].
4.6 Existing Detection Methods
As quickly as botnet technology is evolving, so too must the methodologies
attempting to keep up to date with the latest botnet advancements. Primarily,
the objective of any botnet investigation is to attempt to decipher the methods
of communication used by the system. This is in order to eavesdrop on the
77
botnet chatter in an attempt to record the manner with which the botnet
propagates itself, what commands the botnet is executing, what systems are at
risk and how many machines are infected. There are three main entry points
to P2P botnet investigation [113]:
1. Deliberately infect a host and participate in the botnet. This is the
most realistic scenario as a real machine is infected and, as a result, no
flags should be raised to either the bot client or any other peers that an
investigation is taking place. In this instance, the network traffic of the
machine can be monitored and analysed.
2. Deliberately infect a virtual host (or multiples thereof). This allows
multiple bot clients to run on the same physical machine allowing
much more network traffic to be gathered in a shorter period of time.
However, many modern bots have the ability to detect if their host is a
virtual machine and may adjust their behaviour accordingly.
3. Create a crawler and mimic the protocol used by the botnet. In order
for a crawler to be built, the bot itself will need to be completely reverse
engineered. The crawler can then act as though it were a regular bot on
the network to every other peer. This method awards the investigator
much control over the network, from enumeration to forwarding bogus
commands and potentially destroying the botnet.
Irrespective of the method used, the investigation will appear similar to that
outlined in Figure 4.12. A client machine in a controlled, forensically sound
environment will attempt to partake in the botnet. In order not to raise any
flags to any built-in, counter-forensic measures to either the botnet client
or any other peers on the network, this client machine must appear as any
other regular infected machine. All network communication from that client
machine can then be monitored, recorded and analysed.
In 2009, Feily et al. highlighted four main categories of detection available in
botnet investigation [115]:
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Figure 4.12: Typical Investigation Topology
1. Signature based detection – This can only be used to aid in the detection
of known bots and operates in a similar fashion to regular anti-virus
signature detection, besides being applied to the identification of
network traffic streams using an Intrusion Detection System.
2. Anomaly based detection – This attempts to identify botnet activity
based on network anomalies such as high network latency, high volumes
of traffic, suspicious port usage and other unusual system behaviour.
3. DNS based detection – Due to the prevalence of dynamic DNS (DDNS)
providers being employed to avoid hardcoding C&C server IP addresses,
the unusual querying of a DDNS provider may trigger detection.
4. Mining based detection – Identifying C&C based traffic may prove
difficult, as they generally operate on commonly used ports, e.g., HTTP
traffic on TCP port 80. C&C traffic is also generally quite infrequent and
of low volume. As a result, data mining techniques, such as classification
and clustering can be used efficiently to detect C&C traffic.
In 2013, Vania et al. published the Table 4.1 which presents the most up to date
facts about the various detection methods outlined above [138]. From the data,
it is clear that no single detection method is perfect and as a result, multiple
methods should be deployed in any detection system.
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Detection
Type
Unknown
Bot
Detection
Protocol &
Structure
Independent
Encrypted
Bot
Detection
Real-time
Detection
Low False
Positive
Signature No No No No Yes
Anomaly Yes No Yes No No
DNS Yes Yes No No No
Mining Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Table 4.1: Comparison of Botnet Detection Techniques
4.6.1 Host Based Approach
In 2007, Nummipuro outlined the three main methods available for detecting
and identifying P2P botnets on an infected host machine [139]:
1. Tracking Network Data – This involves tracking the remote machines
that a specific process is in communication with. Communication with
known C&C servers can aid in identifying a botnet system.
2. Analysing Network Data – This involves the analysis of the payload of
individual packets to identify common botnet communication patterns.
3. Behaviour Based Identification – When a specific piece of malware is
running on an infected machine, it calls on specific Microsoft Windows
API functions. The behaviour of these calls, in combination with one or
both of the above methods, can help identify the infection.
4.6.2 Hardware Based Approach
Honeypots are a common system used to detect security threats, collect
malware and to understand the behaviours of malware and their perpetrators
[104]. Honeypots are specially constructed computers or network traps which
attract malicious attacks. However, advancements in botnet technology has
resulted in more intelligent honeypot aware, self-destructing bots. From
2006, forensic researchers began documenting ways that a bot could detect
that it was running in a honeypot [140]. The earliest detection methods were
based on the assumption that security and forensic professionals have liability
80
constraints, such that they cannot allow their infected honeypots to participate
in real (or too many real) attacks. Subsequently honeypot detection methods
expanded to include firewall, anti-virus and virtual machine detection.
Deep packet inspection (as outlined in Section 3.6.2) is another common
hardware based approach and may be used in conjunction with honeypots.
4.7 Investigation Types
4.7.1 Anatomy
Investigating the anatomy of a particular botnet includes analysis of the
behaviour of the bot binary and analysis of the network communication
patterns. This type of investigation attempts to classify the botnet as
centralised/decentralised, client-server or P2P based command and control.
The classification can continue past the architecture of the system to cover
some of its counter-detection and anti-forensic techniques. For example, Goel
et al. discovered that “Agobot” had a built in defence mechanism to kill an
upgradable list of over 610 anti-virus programs [141].
4.7.2 Wide-Area Measurement
Wide-area measurement investigations concentrates on attempting to
enumerate the population of the botnet, the bandwidth usage, the
computational capabilities as well as the commands being issued. Gathering
the population of a botnet is a non-trivial task, as the number of nodes
connecting to a C&C server may only ever count for a small proportion of the
total infected nodes. There are two definitions of a botnet’s size, as specified
by Rejab et al. [142]:
1. Footprint – This indicates the aggregated total number of machines that
have been compromised over time.
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2. Live Population – This measure denotes the number of compromised
machines that are concurrently in communication with the C&C server.
A relatively straightforward method for measuring the size of a botnet is to
run a bot on a deliberately infected machine and monitor the resultant traffic.
The number of IP addresses the infected node is in communication with can be
easily counted, having eliminated all non-botnet related network traffic. While
it would be unsafe to assume that a single node will ultimately communicate
with every other node over any reasonable timeframe; increasing the number
of infected machines (physically or virtually) and amalgamating the results
should lead to a more accurate representation.
Byung et al. proposed in 2009 a methodology for improving botnet size
estimates through the implementation of a botnet crawler, called Passive
P2P Monitor (PPM) [143]. PPM acts as though it were the same as any other
node on the network by implementing the “Overnet Protocol”, as explained
below. This method involves mimicking the functionality of a regular bot with
regards to maintaining the DHT. For each peer the crawler connects to, it can
ask for a list of all known peers. In this manner, a list of all known peers on
the network can be compiled. This approach closely resembles that employed
in the crawling of P2P file-sharing networks described in Section 3.6.1.
4.7.3 Takeover
Botnet takeover involves a third party gaining control of a botnet from its
owner. This third party could be law enforcement, researchers or another
botmaster. Once control of the botnet has been gained, the new botmaster
is able to issue commands, update configurations and operate the botnet as
desired. In 2009, Stone-Gross et al. successfully took over the Torpig botnet for
10 days [125]. During this time, the researchers identified more than 180,000
compromised machines and were sent over 70GB of automatically harvested
personal information.
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Figure 4.13: Unique Bot IDs and IP Addresses per Hour
The number of discovered unique Torpig bot IDs and corresponding number
of IP addresses can be seen in Figure 4.13 [144]. The discrepancy between
the number of bots and IP addresses found is accountable by network effects
such as DHCP churn and NAT. Stone-Gross et al. discovered 182,914 different
bot IDs originating from 1,247,642 distinct IP addresses over the ten day
controlling window.
4.7.4 Investigation Obstacles
Many of the obstacles facing an investigation on P2P botnets are shared by the
investigation of any P2P network, documented or undocumented [6]:
1. DHCP – Due to a typical lease from an Internet service provider lasting
in the order of 2-7 days, dynamic reallocation of the same IP address
may result in two or more infected machines participating in the network
appearing as a single peer.
2. Proxy servers – Similar to the issue caused by DHCP, any bots that access
the Internet through a transparent or anonymous proxy server will also
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appear as a single bot.
3. NAT – Numerous machines behind a shared router may appear to the
outside world as a single machine, as a result of sharing a single external
IP address.
4. Encrypted Communication – Should the bot employ encrypted
communication, the only method available for investigation is to
attempt to reverse engineer the bot. The decryption key for any
incoming commands must be stored within the bot’s client.
5. Difficulty in Take Down – Fighting back against botnets is often a matter
of discovering a vulnerability in the design. Traditionally, this has meant
attempting to take down their centralised C&C server [145]. However,
with the popularity of employing a fully decentralised network design,
the ability to take down a botnet has been made considerably more
difficult. Should the bot be reverse engineered, it is possible that the
botnet could be destroyed or “imploded”, i.e., through the issuing of an
uninstall command to each infected node.
4.8 Case Studies
4.8.1 Nugache
Nugache used a list of 22 hardcoded IP addresses which each newly infected
host attempted to connect to [118]. These 22 hosts maintained a list of active
nodes, which they shared with each new node. The list of active nodes that
any given peer maintained always contained the initial 22 hosts, along with
any newly shared active IP addresses. The weakness of this design is that
once these 22 hardcoded nodes are taken down, no newly connecting peer
will be able to gather its initial list of active peers to communicate with. The
Nugache botnet communicates across its own bespoke network protocol. The
communication between each node is not encrypted, but there is a degree of
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obfuscation employed [121]. In June 2007, Dittrich et al, discovered that there
were at least 6,000 active IP:port pairs in the Nugache botnet at any given time
and a total infected footprint of nearly 11,000 IP:port pairs [113]. It was also
discovered that Nugache propagated itself through two remotely accessible
exploits in the Window’s LSASS and RPC-DCOM services, emailing copies of
itself to targets found in the Windows Address Book and via instant messenger
clients, such as AIM and MSN Messenger.
4.8.2 Storm
The “Storm” botnet, first discovered in January 2007 [146], was the first botnet
discovered that utilised a P2P protocol. It spread through a mixture of social
engineering and exploiting vulnerabilities in Windows XP and Windows 2000.
The social engineering aspect of the worm was realised through the sending of
topical, newsworthy emails with attachments or links to videos and pictures,
which were in fact executables to infect the user’s machine. When it infected
any given machine, it would disable the Windows firewall and open a number
of TCP and UDP ports. Communication in the Storm botnet relies on the
“Overnet Protocol”. Once the malware was installed and the host machine
was configured, it would then bootstrap onto the Overnet network and start
listening for commands. The worm was also engineered to aggressively attack
anyone who attempted to reverse engineer it [147].
The Overnet Protocol utilises a DHT, storing the IP addresses and unique
IDs of each active peer in the network [148]. It is based on the Kademlia
algorithm, similarly to BitTorrent [147]. Kademlia assigns a 160-bit hash ID
to each participating peer on the network. Each peer maintains a local routing
table consisting of the binding values for other peers that are ”close” to their
own ID. In order to bootstrap onto the DHT, the Storm bot has a hardcoded
list of over one hundred peers it can connect to [139].
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4.8.3 Waledec
The Waledec botnet has striking similarities to the Storm botnet, while
simultaneously exhibiting unique refinements to aid in network uptime
and performance, but in part more vulnerable to attack. Waledec follows
a hierarchical architecture design. The lowest level were the spammer
nodes, which, as their name implies, were responsible for sending spam
emails. These spammer nodes communicated exclusively with repeater
nodes or super-nodes. These super-nodes, in turn, were in control of the
communication with the spammer nodes and would receive their commands
from the next level up, known as the sub-controllers [149]. The highest level
in the hierarchy, the C&C server, only communicated directly with these
sub-controllers.
Similar to the Storm botnet, the Waledec binary contains a list of hardcoded
nodes to use to bootstrap onto the network. In the event of all of these
hardcoded nodes being offline, a dynamic URL is also included in the binary
to fall back on HTTP to receive commands. Due to this HTTP fall-back,
this category of botnet can be referred to as a “HTTP2P” botnet [112].
Communication between nodes is encrypted, initially using a constant key for
all nodes, which later evolved into a frequently changing key, which would
be created at the C&C server and passed down the hierarchy [149].
4.8.4 Zeus
The Zeus botnet is one of the largest botnets in the world [?]. Zeus uses
an entirely decentralised P2P architecture and, like the majority of other
botnets, it originally only operated on Microsoft Windows, but variants have
been discovered infecting Blackberry and Android mobile phones [150]. An
infected machine attempts to connect to its C&C channel by bootstrapping
on to any one of hundreds of predefined nodes. The command and control
channel consists of many thousands of server nodes [151]. Its purpose
is primarily to spy on the users of infected machines, with the intent of
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Figure 4.14: Example of an Old Client Requesting Latest Version of Stuxnet via
P2P
gaining financial benefits for the botmaster [152]. It has the ability to log
any information entered by the unsuspecting user, as well as injecting data
displayed on visited web pages. The targeted information includes email
addresses, passwords, online banking accounts, credit card details and
transaction authentication numbers.
4.8.5 Stuxnet
Discovered in June 2010, Stuxnet was the first cyberwarfare weapon targeting
physical infrastructure [120]. It is believed to have been developed by the
United States and Israel in an attack against a nuclear power plant and
processing facility in Natanz, Iran, although no conclusive evidence has
been discovered about who lies responsible [153]. Stuxnet was not remotely
controlled; it was completely stand-alone and spread itself without any further
interaction. The C&C servers that Stuxnet contacted while in operation appear
to have primarily been used for recording evidence of compromise. It spread
via a Microsoft Windows vulnerability and targeted Siemens industrial
software and equipment. This equipment included electronic controllers for
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pumps, valves, thermometers, motors and tachometers used in the nuclear
facility. During the attacks in 2010, Stuxnet temporarily shut down nearly
1,000 of the 5,000 centrifuges Natanz had in operation purifying uranium
[153].
The Stuxnet dropper client was designed to spread itself to as many
machines as possible and spread through network shares, infecting removable
storage devices and exploitation of software vulnerabilities. It utilised P2P
communication for updating itself, as can be seen in Figure 4.14 [154]. The
P2P component had two parts, namely an RPC server and client. When
the malicious code compromises any machine it starts the RPC server.
Through P2P chatter, any other infected machines on the network can update
themselves from any peers that are running code with a higher version
number.
4.9 Ethics of Botnet Mitigation/Takeover
With a lack of precise legal guidance in the investigation of botnets, much
of the decisions required in botnet investigation are left in the hands of
investigators to make the right ethical choices. When Stone-Gross et al. took
over the Torpig botnet in 2009 as described in Section 4.7.3, they used two
principles to guide their investigation [125]:
1. The compromised botnet should be operated so that any harm and/or
damage to victims and targets of attacks would be minimised.
2. The compromised botnet should collect enough information to enable
notification and remediation of affected parties.
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Factors Centralised (IRC,HTTP) Hybrid DDNS Peer-to-Peer P2P
Detection Easy Medium Hard
Resilience Low Fairly High Very High
Latency Low Medium Fairly Hard
Traceback Fairly Hard Hard Very Hard
Complexity Easy High Medium
Experience Very High None Medium
Table 4.2: Comparison of Botnet C&C Architectures
4.10 Summary and Discussion
In this chapter, the evolution of botnet design culminating in Peer-to-Peer
architectures was introduced. Table 4.2 presents a summary of the various
C&C botnet architectures available and the corresponding difficulties
associated with each of the considerations in a botnet developer’s design
decisions [138].
Ultimately, the P2P botnet topology is a desirable option to choose for
botmasters, as it affords them an additional level of anonymity when
conducting their crimes. The ideal design for a P2P botnet is one that is
completely decentralised, utilises unique encryption methods and operates on
a bespoke network protocol for communication. Investigation of such a botnet
may prove particularly difficult. However, a combination of research, network
monitoring, deep packet inspection and network crawling should result in
successful, albeit more labour intensive, investigations. The fundamental
requirement for any newly infected node (or a node coming online) to have
a starting point to bootstrap onto the P2P network and discover other active
nodes will always leave an avenue of investigation open for the digital
investigator.
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CHAPTER
FIVE
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Currently a need exists with law enforcement for a universal P2P investigative
tool capable of identifying the crimes and the criminals behind some of
the world’s largest P2P networks. This thesis proposes a solution to this
problem incorporating the individual investigative techniques required and
a methodology for completing them. A proof of concept tool was developed
and tested on BitTorrent, the world’s largest documented P2P network.
The future plan for expansion upon this work is to produce an intelligent
P2P monitoring tool. Such a collaborative, investigative tool would be of
significant benefit to law enforcement in investigating cybercrimes that utilise
P2P communications.
In total, over 4TB of evidence was gathered using the prototyped system. This
consisted of evidence specific to a number of peers in the order of tens of
millions. A precise number is unattainable due to resource contraints for data
storage throughout the project. The latest prototype of the system processes
the results into a NoSQL database (based on MongoDB) capable of quickly
performing cross-swarm and cross-investigation queries.
5.1 Analysis of Outlined Approach
The approach discussed in Chapter ?? outlines a novel modular universal
P2P network investigation framework. As of the date of this thesis, no other
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collaborative P2P network investigation system exists. The primary benefit of
this collaborative approach is that it can be easily expanded upon and updated
to create a leading tool in the arsenal of the forensic investigator. Through
shared resources and expertise, many wasted man hours could be reallocated
to the analysis of the evidence and the prosecution of those responsible for P2P
based cybercrimes. It is envisioned that this framework will be made available
for collaboration to law enforcement. This should help to eliminate some of
the redundancy of efforts by local law enforcement agencies in an attempt to
combat P2P based cybercrimes.
5.1.1 Enhancements
Due to the aforementioned commonality in design and implementation of P2P
networks, it is envisioned that the proof-of-concept P2P network investigation
framework should be expanded to handle any P2P network.
Given the gathered network traffic from any active node of a new P2P
network, the system should be enhanced to automatically determine the
networks topology, protocols and available commands. This would greatly
speed up the first two steps, as shown in Figure ??, and enable the monitoring
procedures to commence as early as possible in the investigation.
5.2 Further Ideas
While the objectives of the research outlined in this thesis were met, there are
some ideas and features which could be added to (or used in conjunction with
the existing system) to improve the overall level of functionality. Potential
modifications to the current system include implementing automated P2P
network traffic pattern recognition, creation of a comprehensive database of
P2P network signatures and automated result processing.
The framework developed was designed and prototyped in such a manner as
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to easily facilitate the expansion of the tool to deal with any P2P network. It is
hoped that in the future, numerous botnet investigation bodies will contribute
to the maintenance and development of the framework.
5.2.1 Bespoke Hardware Device
A specific hardware device could be created to piggyback between an
infected machine and its Internet connection. When in operation, this device
would automatically acquire network evidence from the suspect computer’s
communication. This device could subsequently perform on-the-fly network
identification and processing of the live communications.
5.2.2 P2P Audio/Video Reconstruction
With P2P technology being increasingly utilised for VOIP communication, the
reconstruction of captured audio or video content could be crucial to forensic
event reconstruction activities. Through the analysis of captured UDP packets,
the voice/video call should be capable of being reconstructed. Using pattern
analysis, collected evidence could be reconstructed to potentially better quality
than the original call, i.e., patching collected packets together in the correct
order.
With the popularity of P2P based file-sharing, this reconstruction could also be
used the verification of suspected content as being a true copy of the original.
In this scenario, a partial sample of the entire content could be used to verify
the infringement of copyright.
5.2.3 Usability Test
As outlined as part of the technical requirements of the UP2PNIF system in
Section ??, the framework should be relatively easy to use for regular law
enforcement officers and should require minimal training. In order to measure
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this requirement, a usability test should be conducted. This test should invite
law enforcement officers and digital forensic investigators to take part. The
groups should be randomly divided into two teams, each given the same task
of collecting digital evidence from known P2P networks. The two teams would
be divided as follows:
1. One team would not be given any instruction on how to use the
framework.
2. The second team would be given a short introduction to using the
framework, how it operates and the best practices while using the tool.
Should both teams achieve their task in a similar time frame, the ease of use
of the tool would be proven. This result would also prove the reduced level
required of digital forensic expertise to use the tool. Feedback received from
the usability testing could be useful in building upon the current system.
5.2.4 NIST Computer Forensics Tool Testing
Computer Forensics Tool Testing (CFTT) is a standardised set of tests
procedures, criteria and hardware compatibility checking performed by NIST
to validate computer forensic tools for use by law enforcement. When a
sufficient number of P2P networks are added to the system, the tool should be
sent for independent, third-party verification.
5.3 Future Vision
5.3.1 P2P in the Cloud
With many everyday services being pushed to the cloud in recent years, one
could assume that P2P networks themselves might become redundant in the
future. However, alongside the push for cloud based services and storage,
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there has also been a significant rise in P2P anonymity services and P2P-aided,
cloud driven services, e.g., P2P based streaming services such as Spotify and
BitTorrent Live. Controlling a botnet from the cloud could easily facilitate
criminals in adding an additional, often temporary, layer of removal from the
botnet itself. This potentially could aid the botmaster in avoiding detection
completely.
5.3.2 Mobile P2P
The vast majority of botnets existing today are developed to be executed on
desktop computers worldwide. However, in the future, it is envisioned that
mobile botnets will become commonplace. Smartphones and 3G-enabled
tablets are an ideal “next target” device for botnet developers as they are
difficult to trace solely based on the data connection. The mobile devices
themselves are becoming more powerful with each device having its own
always-on Internet connection [164].
5.4 Conclusion
The phenomenon of the ever increasing number of crimes being aided by
P2P networks is set to continue into the future due to the level of anonymity
provided to cybercriminals. As a result of this inevitable increase in P2P
based cybercrimes, digital forensic investigators’ workload is set to drastically
increase. Any saving of the investigators’ time that can be allocated to
performing the analysis of captured evidence will help to aid the turn around
time for investigations.
This thesis proposed and validated the viability of a forensically sound, P2P
evidence acquisition framework. This framework processes the network
evidence into an “investigation-ready” state for the forensic laboratory as
early into the investigative process as possible. The existing model for P2P
network evidence acquisition generally requires a digital investigator to first
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develop a bespoke tool capable of deciphering the captured packets from
a compromised machine. The use of the UP2PNIF system can significantly
improve on this traditional model by fast-tracking the investigation.
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APPENDIX
A
GRAPHICAL RESULTS
Figure A.1: Daft Punk: Active Swarm Size over 24 Hours
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Figure A.2: Daft Punk: Newly Discovered Peers Identified per Crawl
(Excluding the Initial Crawl)
Figure A.3: Daft Punk: Overall Average Peer Crawl Count
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Figure A.4: Daft Punk: Average Peer Connection Time for 0-200 Crawl Count
Figure A.5: Daft Punk: Top 10 Countries Hourly Activity (GMT)
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Figure A.7: Daft Punk: Geolocation for Mainland Europe
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Figure A.9: Game of Thrones S03E07/S03E08: Swarm Sizes over 24 hours
Figure A.10: Game of Thrones: Top 30 Countries
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Figure A.11: Game of Thrones S03E07: Mainland Europe Activity
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Figure A.14: Game of Thrones S03E08: Mainland Europe Activity
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Figure A.17: Game of Thrones: Collated Results for S03E07 (Red) and S03E08
(Green) in Mainland Europe
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Figure A.19: Top 100 Swarms: Geolocation of the peers found across Ireland
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Figure A.20: Top 100 Swarms: Geolocation of the peers found across the
United Kingdom
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